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INTRODUCTION
The 2008 Great Recession arose from a massive, wide-scale disruption to the
United States housing market.1 In the years leading up to it, a “bubble” of
artificially inflated home prices had grown, leading some homeowners to
refinance their debt or take out second mortgages.2 In addition, financial
institutions relied more heavily on subprime mortgages, with which they lent to
high-risk consumers who carried greater likelihoods of defaulting on their debt.3
When the bubble burst, many individuals saw the value of their houses plummet
and their mortgages become “underwater,” meaning that the amount they owed
exceeded the value of their homes.4 This collapse in the real estate market
subjected many people to eviction as a result of foreclosure actions, which in
turn further depressed housing values.5 Lending institutions ultimately
foreclosed on the homes of millions of Americans over the course of the Great
Recession and in the years that followed.6 Over the next decade, the crisis
abated, and the real estate market largely—but not entirely—rebounded from
the chaos of the Great Recession.7
1 See Judy Fox, The Future of Foreclosure Law in the Wake of the Great Housing Crisis of 2007-2014, 54
WASHBURN L.J. 489, 489-94 (2015) (describing “subprime lending, a housing bubble, lax underwriting
standards, dropping home prices, credit default swaps, and the deregulation of the lending industry” as
potential causes for the foreclosure crisis).
2 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ROOT
CAUSES OF THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS (2010), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/fore
closure_09.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GUC-6CK8].
3 John V. Duca, Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2007–2010, FED. RES. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013),
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/subprime_mortgage_crisis [https://perma.cc/5JVJ-NZPX].
4 Id.
5 See Les Christie, Foreclosures up a Record 81% in 2008, CNN MONEY (Jan. 15, 2009, 3:48 AM),
https://money.cnn.com/2009/01/15/real_estate/millions_in_foreclosure/ [https://perma.cc/8XVC-Z
H2L] (noting that US foreclosure ﬁlings spiked 225% from 2006 to 2008 and that home prices had
fallen more than 21% from their peak).
6 By one estimate, almost 7.8 million foreclosures occurred in the decade between 2007 and 2016.
See CORELOGIC, UNITED STATES RESIDENTIAL FORECLOSURE CRISIS: TEN YEARS LATER 3
(2017), https://www.corelogic.com/research/foreclosure-report/national-foreclosure-report-10-year.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K3XJ-YRDP]. Each year from 2008 to 2011 saw at least 950,000 completed
foreclosures (meaning that an auction occurred and the home was purchased). Id. at 4-5, 7.
7 See Menqui Sun, Another Sign the US is Recovering from the Financial Crisis—Foreclosures Hit a 10Year Low, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 12, 2017, 8:08 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/us-foreclosures-hit10-year-low-after-financial-crisis2017-1 [https://perma.cc/XA5U-L9NG] (finding a dramatic decrease
since the peak of the housing crisis in the number of annual foreclosures); U.S. Foreclosure Activity Drops
to 13-Year Low in 2018, ATTOM DATA SOLUTIONS (Jan. 17, 2019) [hereinafter ATTOM DATA
SOLUTIONS], https://www.attomdata.com/news/most-recent/2018-year-end-foreclosure-market-report
[https://perma.cc/EBD5-FSJG] (calculating that the number of U.S. properties with foreclosure filings
has dropped from a high of 2.87 million in 2010 to roughly 625,000 in 2018). Some of the impacts of the
Great Recession, however, could still be felt even years later. See Robert Hennelly, America’s Foreclosure
Crisis Isn’t Over, CBS NEWS (Jan. 26, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/americasforeclosure-crisis-isnt-over [https://perma.cc/ZP4Q-BSBW] (describing lingering delays in processing
foreclosure cases and redefaults by borrowers who received federal relief from their initial mortgage

2020]

Finality and Foreclosure

1747

The COVID-19 pandemic, ongoing as of the writing of this Comment,
threatens to upset the recovery and bring new upheaval to the housing market.
To help the millions of Americans spending weeks or months out of work due
to lockdowns, illness, or unemployment, government authorities across the
country have tried to soften the recession’s economic blow by temporarily
banning foreclosures and evictions.8 Those efforts may delay but may well be
unable to prevent a significant uptick in foreclosures resulting from the
pandemic-induced economic downturn, especially as the moratoria begin to
expire.9 And even prior to the crisis, foreclosure posed a significant threat to
millions of homeowners struggling to keep up with their mortgage payments.10
It is this context that makes the Seventh Circuit’s recent jurisprudential
shift in the treatment of mortgage foreclosure litigation particularly significant.
In 2014, the court in HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Townsend marked a novel
approach to the appeals process in the foreclosure arena.11 It dismissed an
appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the district court’s order of foreclosure
was not “final.”12 The court did so despite the fact that the judgment
determined the amount the homeowner owed the bank and the priority of
claims against him, ordered a sale of the property, and indicated how the
defaults during the Recession). In fact, the Seventh Circuit case at the heart of this Comment is “one of
the flood of mortgage foreclosure cases that hit the country after the 2008 economic downturn.” HSBC
Bank USA, N.A. v. Townsend, 793 F.3d 771, 773 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 897 (2016).
8 See Katy O’Donnell, HUD, Fannie, Freddie Suspend Foreclosures, Evictions During Outbreak,
POLITICO (Mar. 18, 2020, 4:03 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/18/hud-suspendsforeclosures-evictions-coronavirus-135783 [https://perma.cc/53UG-CHKF].
9 See Jeff Andrews, A Foreclosure Crisis Could Still Happen, CURBED (July 27, 2020, 11:00 AM),
https://www.curbed.com/2020/7/27/21335855/coronavirus-foreclosures-housing-crisis [https://per
ma.cc/39HV-YE25] (“[M]ortgage-delinquency rates are jumping as the pandemic rages on,
showing that any lapse in government policy could cause a minor housing crash.”); Evan
Weinberger, U.S. Stimulus May Merely Delay Coronavirus Foreclosure Wave, BLOOMBERG L. (April
17, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/u-s-stimulus-may-merely-delaycoronavirus-foreclosure-wave [https://perma.cc/5WYL-U367].
10 See, e.g., Matthew Goldstein, Goldman Sachs Forecloses on 10,000 Homes for ‘Consumer Relief,’
N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/22/business/goldman-sachsmortgage-foreclosure.html [https://perma.cc/8WV2-ESKW] (chronicling how investment bank
Goldman Sachs has foreclosed on thousands of homes despite promising to help struggling
homeowners after the Great Recession); ATTOM DATA SOLUTIONS, supra note 7 (observing
growth in foreclosure initiations in 2018 in more than one-third of all state and local housing markets
and double-digit percentage increases in foreclosures in major markets). The signiﬁcant risk of
foreclosure has also been aggravated by ﬂaws in the process itself and mistakes on the part of lenders.
See Deon Roberts, Fresh Outrage for Wells Fargo After Mortgage Error Led to Hundreds of Foreclosures,
CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 7, 2018, 10:15 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-wells-fargoforeclosures-20180807-story.html [https://perma.cc/FU3F-TEW2].
11 793 F.3d 771.
12 Id. at 773-74. For clarity, when this Comment refers to a “foreclosure order” or “judgment of
foreclosure,” these terms indicate the district court’s judgment finding the mortgagor liable and ordering
a foreclosure sale, while a “confirmation order” or similar language refers to the judgment approving the
completed sale of the foreclosed property (and, if applicable, entering a deficiency judgment).
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proceeds would be paid out.13 To seek appellate review of a district court’s
foreclosure order, the Seventh Circuit held, a homeowner who remains unable
to cure his debt must wait for his house to go through a foreclosure sale and
have the court conclude that the sale was satisfactory.14 Only the district court’s
last order confirming the sale would be sufficiently final to allow for appeal.15
The practical implications of this approach mean that a homeowner can only
file an appeal to challenge the underlying merits of his foreclosure very late in
the process. The Townsend rule bars a defendant from doing so at any point until
the court enters judgment confirming the sale—at which point the homeowner,
under Illinois law, only has thirty days before he must turn over his property.16
It is only at this stage that a homeowner can seek appellate review of the
underlying merits of his foreclosure, much less any legal issues arising from the
sale and confirmation process.17 While the defendant can request a stay of the
order of sale while he appeals his case, the Seventh Circuit has not yet articulated
a clear standard for what he must show in order to obtain one.18 Absent a stay,
Id.
Id. at 774-75.
Id. at 776.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1501(d) (2018) (noting that thirty days after the conﬁrmation of
the sale, the buyer automatically becomes “entitled to possession of the mortgaged real estate” and
may bring eviction proceedings if necessary against those whose interests in the house were
terminated by the foreclosure). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide no relief beyond this,
at least as of right. Under the Rules, absent an exception or a showing by a litigant, “execution on a
judgment and proceedings to enforce it” are only automatically stayed for thirty days after its entry.
FED. R. CIV. P. 62(a).
17 Townsend, 793 F.3d at 777-79; see also Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Cornish, 759 F. App’x 503,
508 (7th Cir. 2019) (acknowledging Townsend’s “important practical consequences,” which mean that a
debtor-appellant can “no longer appeal at all, on any issue—including the money judgment on the
underlying debt . . . —until after the district court approved the sale of her home”). The homeowner
can only raise objections to the propriety of the sale or to the absence of notice of the sale before
the court at the hearing conﬁrming the sale. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1508(b) (2018).
18 Up until 2018, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an appellant could obtain a stay of
a monetary judgment pending appeal by posting a “supersedeas bond.” FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d) (repealed
2018). The new iteration of the Rule replaced this language to allow an appellant to provide a “bond or
other security” to obtain a stay as of right, FED. R. CIV. P. 62(b), raising the issue of what type of
security interest would satisfy this standard. The Seventh Circuit tentatively addressed the question in
Cornish, a nonprecedential opinion. 759 F. App’x at 510. There, the court preliminarily concluded
(without argument from the parties) that in a foreclosure case, the bank’s interest in the mortgage
would be sufficient to entitle a homeowner to a stay while he appeals. Id. Even as it framed a final order
of foreclosure under Townsend as sufficiently analogous to a monetary judgment, however, the court
acknowledged that such an order contains some “injunctive aspects,” since it instructs the homeowner
to turn over his property to the buyer who purchased it in the foreclosure sale. Id. at 506.
If the Seventh Circuit, in a precedential opinion, were to view these orders as injunctions and not
as monetary judgments, it may need to reevaluate Cornish’s holding. The ordinary standard for staying
an injunction pending appeal is a different one: it involves weighing the appellant’s likelihood of success
on the merits; any irreparable harm the appellant will suffer absent a stay; any substantial injury to other
parties in the case that would result if the court issues the stay; and the public interest. See Nken v.
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433-34 (2009); Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). Picking up on this
13
14
15
16
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nothing prevents the new buyer of the house from taking possession of the
defendant’s home in the meanwhile.19
Meanwhile, several other courts of appeals have disagreed. The Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have all read the Supreme Court’s precedents
differently, holding that the district court’s order of foreclosure constitutes a
final judgment if it finds the defendant liable, specifies the amount of damages
owed, designates the property to be sold, and orders a foreclosure sale.20
This Comment explores these two competing views on when a
homeowner can seek review by an appellate court during the foreclosure
process. I begin in Part I by outlining the two bodies of law central to this
Comment: state foreclosure statutory law and federal appellate jurisdiction
doctrine. Next, Part II presents the Seventh Circuit’s and the other courts of
appeals’ perspectives on when a judgment in the foreclosure process becomes
ﬁnal. I then argue in Part III that the Seventh Circuit incorrectly applies the
Supreme Court’s ﬁnality precedents and advocate in favor of the adoption of
the other circuits’ approach. Finally, in Part IV, I present potential judicial
and legislative solutions for resolving the circuit split.
I. FIRST PRINCIPLES: FORECLOSURE AND FINALITY
The issue this Comment explores is at the heart of the intersection between
two distinct bodies of law: foreclosure law and the doctrine of appellate
jurisdiction. Foreclosure provides the vehicle through which a lender collects on
a debt secured by property when the borrower ceases to pay his debt. As
governed by the loan agreement between the parties and applicable law, the
lender is generally entitled to sell off the property and apply the proceeds to the
borrower’s outstanding debt. When the lender brings an action in federal court
to obtain a foreclosure order, the case must satisfy various jurisdictional
requirements. One of these, which concerns the appellate jurisdiction of the
courts of appeals, is the final judgment rule. Under that principle, a party can
usually only appeal an order from the district court that is sufficiently “final.”
This Part sketches the relevant aspects of each of these legal doctrines.

reasoning, the dissent in Cornish argued that the four-factor injunction test should govern grants of stays
in mortgage foreclosure appeals. 759 F. App’x at 510-12 (St. Eve, J., dissenting). Given the
nonprecedential nature of the opinion, as well as the hesitancy with which the Seventh Circuit announced
its approach, see id. at 504 n.2 (majority opinion), the standard that would govern stays of foreclosure
proceeding while a homeowner appeals a judgment of foreclosure presents an interesting question, albeit
one that falls beyond the scope of this Comment.
19 See, e.g., id. at 508 (noting that absent a stay, “which would have been essentially automatic in an
appeal of the underlying judgment on the debt before Townsend,” a defendant would likely be “evicted in
a matter of days without any meaningful opportunity to present her arguments to this court”).
20 See infra Section II.B.
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A. The Mortgage Foreclosure Process
The issue of foreclosure arises when a borrower fails to meet his financial
obligations on a secured debt he owes.21 Most frequently, a homeowner incurs
this debt by taking out a mortgage to finance the purchase of his house. As part
of a mortgage transaction, in exchange for receiving a loan from his lender, the
debtor promises to pay back the debt pursuant to a set schedule—and grants
the lender a security interest in their house.22 The security interest means that
if the borrower defaults on the loan and is unable to continue paying his debt,
the lending party has the right to initiate foreclosure, selling the property
(referred to as collateral) at a public auction and retaining the proceeds to the
extent necessary to fulfill the unpaid debt.23 A creditor may also obtain a
security interest (also known as a lien24) in a person’s home through other
means. For example, if a person fails to pay his federal taxes, the IRS can take
out a tax lien on his house and foreclose on it to collect the outstanding debt if
he still fails to fulfill his obligations.25 Another common category of security
interest, a “mechanic’s lien,” arises in certain circumstances when a laborer
provides construction services on credit; that laborer obtains an interest in the
property on which he worked to secure the payment he is owed.26
The means through which a lender can effectuate a foreclosure depend on
what the relevant body of (typically state) law governing the lien permits, as
well as on the terms of the documents that created the security interest.27 States
vary in their approaches to foreclosure. All states have authorized a judicial
foreclosure process, in which the lender must bring an action in court to seek
21 See Foreclosure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining the term as a “legal
proceeding to terminate a mortgagor’s interest in property, instituted by the lender (the mortgagee)
either to gain title or to force a sale in order to satisfy the unpaid debt secured by the property”).
22 See Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1033 (2019) (describing a mortgage
as “a security interest in the property designed to protect the creditor’s investment”); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 1.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1996) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROP.] (“A mortgage is a conveyance or retention of an interest in real property as security for
performance of an obligation.”).
23 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP., supra note 22, intro. (“[I]n the United States nearly
all states today employ a process of foreclosure by auction sale . . . . [T]he sale serves two functions
simultaneously: It establishes a current value for the real estate, and it acts as a marketing device,
liquidating the security and transferring title to some new owner.”); 2 BAXTER DUNAWAY, LAW OF
DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE § 15:1 (2019).
24 See Lien, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining a lien as “[a] legal right or interest
that a creditor has in another’s property, lasting usu[ally] until a debt or duty that it secures is satisfied”).
25 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321, 7403(c) (2018); see also 4 DUNAWAY, supra note 23, § 40:47.
26 See 4 DUNAWAY, supra note 23, § 40:34.
27 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP., supra note 22, intro. (noting that “the foreclosure
process is defined by statute in nearly all American jurisdictions”); 1 DUNAWAY, supra note 23, § 13:3 (“If
the decision has been made to foreclose it is then necessary to determine (1) what type of security
agreement is involved . . . and (2) what type of foreclosure is permitted in the state (or jurisdiction) and
what type is normally used in the state.”).
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foreclosure.28 Some additionally provide for nonjudicial foreclosure.29 There, a
mortgagee30 can simply send a notice of default to the borrower and conduct the
sale without involving the court system.31 In addition, a few states allow for
“strict” foreclosure, in which the court “determines that the borrower’s interest
has been terminated but no public sale of the property is required.”32 This
Comment, however, focuses solely on judicial foreclosures, because they by their
nature necessitate adversarial litigation proceedings before a court.
An individual’s ongoing failure to make payments on their mortgage will
not always result in foreclosure and eviction. State statutes may provide for
a right of redemption. Under such provisions, an individual can pay the full
amount he owes under his mortgage, covering the principal, interest, fees,
and costs to completely fulﬁll his total obligations across the entire life of the
mortgage and eliminate his debt to the lender.33 Mortgagors may also have
the right to reinstate their mortgages. Reinstatement entails paying back any
outstanding principal and interest that is currently owed to the mortgagee;
doing so revives the mortgage and allows the homeowner to continue making
payments on it as before.34
Meanwhile, if a foreclosure sale goes forward, the proceeds may
sometimes be insuﬃcient to cover the entirety of the homeowner’s
outstanding debt on their mortgage. In this case, some state courts will order
28 See Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1034 (2019) (“Every State provides
some form of judicial foreclosure: a legal action initiated by a creditor in which a court supervises sale of
the property and distribution of the proceeds.”); 1 DUNAWAY, supra note 23, § 13:3.
29 See Obduskey, 139 S. Ct. at 1034 (noting that about half of the states allow for nonjudicial
foreclosure, where “notice to the parties and sale of the property occur outside court supervision”);
1 DUNAWAY, supra note 23, § 13:3.
30 Generally, the party offering the mortgage and providing the loan, such as a bank or other financial
institution, is known as a mortgagee, while the homeowner-borrower is referred to as a mortgagor.
31 See Brian D. Feinstein, Judging Judicial Foreclosure, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 406, 412-13
(2018). In a nonjudicial foreclosure, the debtor may seek injunctive relief in court by filing a wrongful
foreclosure action, but the onus is on him to challenge the foreclosure. Id. Absent action on his end, the
mortgagee can foreclose without court involvement. Id. at 413; see also Obduskey, 139 S. Ct. at 1034
(describing one such system in which “the homeowner may contest the creditor’s right to sell the
property, and a hearing will be held to determine whether the sale should go forward”).
32 1 DUNAWAY, supra note 23, § 13:3; see also, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-15 (2019).
33 See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(f) (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.071(C),
2329.33 (LexisNexis 2019); WIS. STAT. § 846.13 (2019); see also DUNAWAY, supra note 23, § 20:1 (“In
all states the borrower has the right . . . to redeem the property by paying the full debt prior to the
foreclosure sale . . . . In about one-half of the states the borrower also has a statutory redemption right
after the foreclosure sale.”); Matthew J. Baker et al., An Economic Theory of Mortgage Redemption
Laws, 36 REAL EST. ECON. 31, 33-35 (2008) (discussing the origins of redemption laws in sixteenthcentury England as well as their role throughout American history).
34 See DUNAWAY, supra note 23, § 15:8 (describing state laws barring foreclosure upon the debtor’s
reinstatement of the loan, which occurs upon “the payment of delinquent payments due or the curing
of other defaults”); see also, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-813(A) (2019); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924c(a)(1)
(2019); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1602; N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:50-57 (2019).
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a personal judgment against the defendant, known as a deﬁciency judgment,
to cover the balance of the debt.35 This obligation follows the defendant even
after the conclusion of the foreclosure process.
Although foreclosure cases often arise in state court, federal district courts
can also hear foreclosure actions through avenues such as diversity36 or federal
question jurisdiction.37 These cases give rise to the federal issues of appellate
jurisdiction and finality of judgments, which this Comment next addresses.
B. Appealability and the Final Judgment Rule
The lodestar of federal appellate jurisdiction is the ﬁnal judgment rule.38
Under this principle, currently codiﬁed at 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the circuit courts
of appeals have jurisdiction of appeals from all “ﬁnal decisions” of the district
courts.39 This requirement has a long history: such a principle ﬁrst appeared
in the ﬁrst Judiciary Act, which allowed “final decrees and judgments in civil
actions in a district court . . . [to] be reexamined, and reversed or aﬃrmed in
a circuit court, holden in the same district, upon a writ of error.”40
Under the Supreme Court’s standard formulation, a final judgment is one
that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but

35 See Obduskey, 139 S. Ct. at 1034 (explaining that “in the event that the foreclosure sale does not
yield the full amount due, a creditor . . . may sometimes obtain a deficiency judgment, that is, a judgment
against the homeowner for the unpaid balance of a debt”); DUNAWAY, supra note 23, § 16:46 (“With [a
deficiency] judgment, the lender can . . . recover directly against the borrower” and his personal assets.).
For examples of state laws authorizing deficiency judgments, see 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1508(b)(2)
(2019), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.08 (LexisNexis 2019), and WIS. STAT. § 846.04(a) (2019).
36 Diversity jurisdiction is proper when the two parties are citizens of different states and the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2018); see also, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v.
Data Lease Fin. Corp., 645 F.2d 333, 335 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981); DUNAWAY, supra note 23, § 21:2.
37 Federal question jurisdiction is met in “civil actions arising under . . . the laws . . . of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also, e.g., United States v. Williams, 796 F.3d 815, 816-17 (7th Cir. 2015)
(involving a suit by a federal agency, the IRS, to foreclose on a tax lien, as governed by a federal statute).
38 See, e.g., Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118, 1131 (2018) (“The normal rule is that a ‘final decision’ confers
upon the losing party the immediate right to appeal. That rule provides clear guidance to litigants.”);
Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686, 1691 (2015) (noting that a party “can typically appeal as of
right only from [a] final decision”); 19 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 202.02 (3d ed. 1999) (describing the final judgment rule as “[t]he centerpiece of the jurisdiction of the
circuit courts of appeal”); 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3905 (2d ed. 1987, updated 2020) (“Unless a proceeding can be brought within one
of the relatively narrow alternative statutory bases for jurisdiction, jurisdiction depends upon the ability
to characterize as ‘final’ the decision subject to appeal.”).
39 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018).
40 Judiciary Act of 1789, Pub. L. No. 1-20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84 (emphasis added); see also Theodore
T. Frank, Comment, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TEX. L. REV. 292, 292 (1966) (noting that
this requirement has continued to appear in every revision of the judicial code). The origins of a final
judgment principle date even further back to seventeenth-century English practice. See WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 38, § 3906 n.2 (citing Metcalfe’s Case (1615) 77 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B.)).
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execute the judgment.”41 Reaching a final judgment does not require completely
concluding the litigation in the trial court. Some questions can still remain
undecided after a final order on the merits, as long as resolving them “will not
alter the order or moot or revise decisions embodied in the order.”42 The
requirement of a final judgment “precludes consideration of decisions that are
subject to revision, and even of ‘fully consummated decisions [that] are steps
towards final judgment in which they will merge,’” because the rule is designed
to prevent appeal of tentative, informal, or incomplete decisions by a district
court.43 In analyzing the finality of an order, the Court gives the final judgment
rule a practical rather than a technical construction.44
While the final judgment rule provides the general analytical framework
for determining appealability, courts have crafted several doctrines that
broaden the notion of what counts as “final.”45 In these areas, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the finality requirement to allow for appellate review of
certain orders that do not end the course of litigation.46 For instance, under the
collateral order doctrine, courts of appeals can hear appeals of orders that finally
determine claims of rights that are separable from, and collateral to, rights
asserted in the action, “too important to be denied review and too independent
of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the
whole case is adjudicated.”47 This principle allows state entities and
governments to appeal a denial of sovereign immunity;48 government officers
to seek review of certain orders denying assertions of absolute or qualified
immunity;49 and a criminal defendant to appeal an order declining to dismiss
an indictment on double jeopardy grounds.50 The Court has also recognized
41 Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); see also Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson
Masonry, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582, 586 (2020) (“A ‘ﬁnal decision” within the meaning of § 1291 is
normally limited to an order that resolves the entire case.”).
42 Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988).
43 Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305 (1996) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)); see also Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686, 1691-92 (2015) (“This
rule reflects the conclusion that ‘[p]ermitting piecemeal, prejudgment appeals . . . undermines
efficient judicial administration and encroaches upon the prerogatives of district court judges, who
play a special role in managing ongoing litigation.’” (quoting Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter,
558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
44 See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546 (“The eﬀect of the statute is to disallow appeal from any decision
which is tentative, informal or incomplete.”).
45 MOORE, supra note 38, § 202.02.
46 Id.
47 Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546; accord Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)
(requiring that an appealable collateral order “must conclusively determine the disputed question,
resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment”).
48 P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 147 (1993).
49 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-27 (1985); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742-43 (1982).
50 Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977).
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another extension of the final judgment rule in Forgay v. Conrad, authorizing
appeals of some rulings as final orders if failing to allow for appellate review
would result in “irreparable injury” to the appellant.51
Congress, meanwhile, has recognized several exceptions to the final
judgment rule, allowing for interlocutory appeals of orders that, while
insufficiently final to satisfy § 1291, nonetheless merit receiving appellate review
when they are issued rather than at the end of the case. Most prominently, it has
granted the courts of appeals jurisdiction over several categories of interlocutory
orders in provisions now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1292.52 This section establishes
appellate jurisdiction over certain interlocutory orders53 and identifies nonfinal
orders reviewable by the Federal Circuit.54 The provision reflects a congressional
purpose to “allow appeals from orders other than final judgments when they
have a final and irreparable effect on the rights of the parties.”55
Congress has also authorized other forms of interlocutory appeals in
narrower substantive contexts56 and via the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.57
The Rules permit litigants to seek interlocutory appeals of denials or grants of
class certification58 and of petitions for extraordinary writs.59 Rule 54(b),
meanwhile, is a special case. When the district court issues an order as to some,
but not all, claims or parties in a case, Rule 54(b) empowers the court to certify
the order as a final judgment, allowing a party to appeal the judgment as to the
portion of the case that the district court has certified.60
Determining what is and is not a judgment over which the courts of appeals
have appellate jurisdiction is not an easy task, as the intricacies of these
51 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204 (1848). As the Seventh Circuit has rightly pointed out, the Supreme
Court has not cited the Forgay doctrine in some time, and its continued legitimacy as a source of appellate
jurisdiction is unclear. See HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Townsend, 793 F.3d 771, 779-81 (7th Cir. 2015).
52 Congressional establishment of the right to appeal interlocutory orders goes at least as far
back as 1891. See Circuit Court of Appeals (Evarts) Act, Pub. L. No. 51-517, § 7, 26 Stat. 826, 828
(1891) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2018)); see also Andrew S. Pollis, The Need for NonDiscretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review in Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1653
(2011) (discussing the early history of federal statutes beginning in 1891 that established appellate
jurisdiction over interlocutory orders).
53 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (2018) (allowing litigants to appeal interlocutory orders that impact
preliminary injunctions, concern receiverships, or arise in admiralty cases); id. § 1292(b) (permitting
discretionary appeals when the district judge certiﬁes that his order involves a controlling question
of law as to which there is substantial ground for diﬀerence of opinion and that an immediate appeal
from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation).
54 Id. § 1292(c).
55 Cohen v. Beneﬁt Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949).
56 These include certain appeals involving arbitration, three-judge district court panels,
criminal cases, and remands to state court. For more detail, see infra note 250.
57 For a more thorough treatment of the rulemaking process and its utility in resolving the
issue presented in this Comment, see infra subsection IV.A.2.
58 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
59 FED. R. APP. P. 21.
60 FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
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doctrines make clear. The final judgment rule initially arose from a historical
understanding of a cause of action as a single judicial unit that could not exist
at the same time in both a district court and an appellate court.61 Beyond this
structural theory, the requirement of a final judgment is designed to avoid
shuttling cases back and forth between district and appellate courts, driven by
a respect for the role of district courts and a desire to promote efficient
adjudication of cases by preventing the “harassment and cost” of multiple
appeals in one case.62 Drawing the line between appealable and nonappealable
orders requires balancing competing considerations:
On the one hand, we strive to provide adequate opportunities for appellate
review from orders . . . if they have a “serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence”
that demands immediate appellate review. On the other hand, “[d]isfavoring
piecemeal appeals is a long-standing policy of the federal courts”; we want to
withhold the right of appeal “when the competing considerations of judicial
economy,” such as the burden on the appellate courts and the delay of
proceedings in the trial courts, “outweigh the need for immediate review.”63

It is these competing policy grounds that have led to the nuances inherent
in both the courts’ final judgment jurisprudence and in the variety of federal
statutes and rules governing appealability.

61 See Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582, 586 (2020) (“Traditionally, every
civil action in a federal court has been viewed as a ‘single judicial unit,’ from which only one appeal would
lie.” (quoting In re Saco Local Dev. Corp., 711 F.2d 441, 443 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer, J.)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Frank, supra note 40, at 292; cf. THOMAS E. BAKER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
A PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 35 (2d ed. 2009), https://
www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/PrimJur2.pdf [https://perma.cc/RHW4-FDWB] (“Functionally, the
requirement structures the relationship between appellate court and trial court; within this relationship,
each court performs its complementary role.”).
62 E.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981); Cobbledick v. United
States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940); see also MOORE, supra note 38, § 202.03 (“The deference rationale for
the final judgment rule appears to have two bases. The first sees interlocutory appeals as an affront to
the authority of the trial judge. The second sees interlocutory appeals as causing inefficiency not only at
the appellate level, but at the trial level as well.”); cf. BAKER, supra note 61, at 35 (“[T]he final-decision
requirement is justified implicitly by an assumption that an even greater inefficiency, or waste of
resources, would result if each and every ruling that might be reversed on appeal were immediately and
separately appealable.”); The Requirement of a Final Judgment or Decree for Supreme Court Review of State
Courts, 73 YALE L.J. 515, 515 (1964) (“The final judgment rule is, at its simplest, a rule of administration
limiting . . . the number of appeals an appellate court will consider.”).
63 Andrew S. Pollis, Civil Rule 54(b): Seventy-Five and Ready for Retirement, 65 FLA. L. REV.
711, 719 (2013) (alteration in original) (footnotes and citations omitted); cf. BAKER, supra note 61, at
36 (“Some rulings . . . may work an independent and irreparable harm during trial and may so
profoundly aﬀect the trial that the appeal–reversal–retrial routine may be ‘too little too late.’”).
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II. TWO COMPETING PERSPECTIVES ON APPELLATE JURISDICTION
OVER MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE APPEALS
In applying appealability doctrine to cases involving foreclosures, the federal
courts of appeals have reached significantly different results. On one side is the
Seventh Circuit’s view of finality as arising only upon the completion of a
foreclosure sale and expiration of any reinstatement or redemption rights. On
the other are multiple courts of appeals that find a judgment of foreclosure
ordering a sale and determining liability to be final for purposes of appeal.
A. The Seventh Circuit’s Novel View of Appealability
In 2005, Kirkland Townsend took out a $136,000 promissory note to
purchase a house and executed a mortgage that was eventually assigned to the
bank HSBC.64 When he ceased making mortgage payments in 2011, HSBC
brought a diversity suit in federal court seeking to foreclose on Townsend’s
home.65 The bank then moved for summary judgment, which the court
granted, entering: (1) a judgment of foreclosure; (2) an order finding the
amount that Townsend owed to the bank in principal, interest, attorney’s fees,
and costs; and (3) an order providing for judicial sale of the property if
Townsend failed to redeem it within the statutory period under Illinois law.66
The district court concluded that the judgment was final and appealable.67 The
court also noted that it would appoint a special commissioner to conduct the
sale, after which it would hold a hearing to confirm the sale and enter a
deficiency judgment against Townsend to cover any share of the debt left
unsatisfied by the proceeds of the confirmed sale.68
The Seventh Circuit dismissed Townsend’s appeal for lack of appellate
jurisdiction.69 In considering the judgment’s ﬁnality, the court concluded that
the district court’s judgment of foreclosure and order of sale “le[ft] too much
up in the air for [it] to regard the action as terminated, with nothing left but
the mechanical details of collection or other enforcement measures.”70
The Seventh Circuit focused on Illinois foreclosure law.71 First, it held that
the existence of reinstatement and redemption options meant that it was
64 HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Townsend, 793 F.3d 771, 773 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.
Ct. 897 (2016).
65 Id. at 773-74.
66 Id. at 774.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 773.
70 Id. at 775.
71 See id. (“Illinois law speciﬁes the various steps that must be taken; it is the governing law in
this diversity action, and so we must see how the district court’s actions ﬁt into the regime Illinois
creates for foreclosures.”).
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possible “to undo the foreclosure, scuttling the need for the process of
executing the judgment.”72 That is, the “entry of the foreclosure judgment
marks the beginning of a period in which critical matters remain to be
resolved: whether the mortgagor will exercise his statutory redemption and
reinstatement rights.”73 Because the defendant could either alter the order or
moot or revise the resolution of the case by exercising either of these rights,
the court reasoned, the judgment of foreclosure was insufficiently final.
The court also emphasized the ambiguous outcome of the judicial sale and
post-sale proceedings. It reasoned that, under its reading of Illinois law, the
district court had discretion to determine whether “justice was otherwise not
done” by the auction and whether there was proper notice of the sale, the sale
was conducted fraudulently, or the sale’s terms were unconscionable.74 If any of
these criteria were met, the court could choose to not confirm the sale. Finally,
the Seventh Circuit pointed to the discretionary ability of the court to decide
whether to order a deficiency judgment and what amount to order.75
Ultimately, the court concluded that it did not believe that the “remaining
steps are so ministerial, inevitable, or unrelated to the merits of the case that
they do not defeat finality” under § 1291.76 The court also rejected other
potential sources of appellate jurisdiction. It held that the district court’s Rule
54(b) certification was insufficient because the judgment of foreclosure and the
subsequent proceedings were not independent claims;77 the appeal was not an
interlocutory appeal of an order affecting an injunction under § 1292(a);78 and,
even assuming that the Forgay doctrine was still good law, there was no imminent
threat of irreparable harm to satisfy that exception to the final judgment rule.79
The court thus dismissed the appeal without reaching its merits.80
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Hamilton squarely rejected the majority’s
analysis.81 From his perspective, the district court’s judgment satisfied “longestablished finality principles” because it “settle[d] the merits and the total
amount of the debt”; “identifie[d] the property to be sold to satisfy the
judgment”; and “order[ed] the priority of competing claims to the sale
proceeds.”82 Overall, he argued, the judgment of foreclosure was merely a
“specialized application” of the usual process of executing a judgment awarding
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id.
Id. at 776.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 777.
Id. at 778.
Id. at 778-79.
Id. at 779-81.
Id. at 781.
Id. (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
Id.
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money damages, and so it should be treated as equally final as a damages order,
despite the complex logistics of executing the foreclosure.83
Judge Hamilton also emphasized that the majority’s rule would have
detrimental practical implications:
[E]ven if we assume that the harshest eﬀects of the majority’s approach on
borrowers will be mitigated by routine stays pending appeal, I suspect the
economic result will be negative for both borrowers and lenders. Consider
the bidding behavior of outside buyers at auctions that take place at two
diﬀerent stages: (a) after the merits of the foreclosure have been settled with
a ﬁnal judgment and the conclusion of any appeal; or (b) while the merits of
the foreclosure are still subject to appeal. Basic economic principles suggest
that, all other things being equal, a buyer should be willing to pay more at
stage (a) than at (b). The buyer at stage (b) may need to keep the bid open
for months or even years, sharply limiting other uses of the money in the
meantime. The result should be lower bid prices in auctions, to the detriment
of both lenders and borrowers. And where a foreclosure is set aside on the
merits after a court-ordered sale, the expense and eﬀort of the sale and its
conﬁrmation will all be for naught.84

Despite these objections, the Seventh Circuit has since continued
analyzing cases using the approach set out in Townsend. In Bank of America,
N.A. v. Martinson, the court—interestingly, in an opinion authored by Judge
Hamilton—examined the appealability of a judgment of foreclosure in a case
brought under Wisconsin law.85 The district court there ruled for the plaintiffmortgagee, set the amount of damages it was owed, entered a judgment of
foreclosure, and ordered sale of the property at a sheriff ’s auction following
the tolling of the redemption period.86 Relying on Wisconsin statutes
governing foreclosures, the Seventh Circuit held that the lower court’s
judgment was not final under § 1291 because it shared the “principal
characteristics” of the one in Townsend: the defendants’ post-judgment right
of redemption, and a court-ordered sale requiring court approval prior to
taking effect.87 Although the court noted that Wisconsin’s foreclosure laws,
unlike Illinois’s, did not satisfy the third Townsend factor, which considered
whether the judgment of foreclosure provided for the determination of a
deficiency judgment, it held that this factor did not play a significant role in
the outcome of Townsend and accordingly gave its absence in the case at hand

83
84
85
86
87

Id. at 784.
Id. at 783 (internal citations omitted).
828 F.3d 532, 533 (7th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 533-34.
Id. at 533-35.
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little weight.88 The court did not address Townsend’s discussion of
reinstatement and redemption rights as one joint factor and did not consider
in its analysis whether Wisconsin, like Illinois, allowed for reinstatement as
well as redemption (which it does).89
Meanwhile, in United States v. Williams, which involved a foreclosure suit by
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in order to execute a tax lien, the Seventh
Circuit distinguished Townsend (while still adhering to its reasoning).90 In
Williams, the district court issued a judgment that specified the amount of the
defendant’s liability and ordered the property to be sold and the proceeds to be
distributed among multiple debtors (in this case, different levels of governments
to whom the defendant owed taxes).91 Unlike the Illinois state law in Townsend,
however, the federal statute under which the IRS brought suit did not provide
for a deficiency judgment for the balance owed after the foreclosure sale, did not
grant the taxpayer a right of redemption, and did not require court confirmation
to effect the sale.92 As a result, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court’s
judgment of foreclosure “end[ed] the litigation and [left] nothing but execution
of the court’s decision,” satisfying the final judgment rule.93
As these cases make clear, the Seventh Circuit has continued to reaffirm the
use of the Townsend factors as the appropriate analytical tool to determine when
a judgment becomes final and appealable. Even as it has done so, however, the
court has recognized the “important practical consequences” of its approach to
appealability and the “great potential for irreparable harm” that may result from
denying homeowners an appeal until late in the foreclosure process.94
B. The View of Other Courts of Appeals
The Seventh Circuit’s approach to appellate jurisdiction in mortgage
foreclosures is novel and notable in large part because of how markedly it
diverges from the approaches taken by several other courts of appeals that have
also addressed the question.
The Ninth Circuit has held that an order granting summary judgment for
a lender and ordering a foreclosure sale of the debtor’s property is a final
judgment for purposes of appeal.95 In Citicorp, the court dealt with a
Id.
See WIS. STAT. § 846.05 (2019) (“An action for the foreclosure of a mortgage . . . shall be
dismissed upon the defendant’s bringing into court, before judgment, the principal and interest due,
with the costs.”).
90 796 F.3d 815, 816-17 (7th Cir. 2015). The IRS sued under 26 U.S.C. § 7403(c) (2018). Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 817.
94 Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Cornish, 759 F. App’x 503, 508 (7th Cir. 2019).
95 Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1998).
88
89
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foreclosure in California.96 Under California law, mortgagors have redemption
and reinstatement rights97 and may be subject to a deficiency judgment if the
sale of property fails to satisfy the amount owed to the lender.98 The Ninth
Circuit stressed that the judgment of foreclosure conclusively established the
defendant’s liability (including a quantified amount of damages) and
identified the property to be sold.99 Therefore, the court concluded that the
foreclosure order “conclusively determine[d] the rights of the parties to the
litigation” and was thus a final judgment—even though the district court
retained jurisdiction for the purpose of assessing any necessary deficiency
judgment that would be determined after the sale of the property.100
The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Citibank, N.A. v. Data
Lease Financial Corp.101 In that case, the district court granted the plaintifflender’s motion for a common law foreclosure sale of the appellant’s collateral
(in that case, shares of stock).102 The defendant appealed after the sale had
taken place and the court had confirmed it.103 The Fifth Circuit held that the
order confirming the sale constituted a final judgment.104 The court went
further: it reasoned that, based on precedents from the Supreme Court and the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits, an order that “directs the immediate sale of
specified property is in all respects” a final judgment that the defendant can
independently appeal.105 Since the foreclosure order and sale confirmation were
each final and appealable, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the defendant’s
failure to appeal the order of foreclosure waived his right to contest the merits
of the foreclosure.106 Instead, on appeal from the confirmation order, the
mortgagor could only challenge the sale and confirmation process.

Id. at 1104-05 n.7.
See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2903–2905, 2924c(e) (2019) (defining redemption and reinstatement
rights, respectively).
98 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(b) (West 2020); see also 6 DUNAWAY, supra note 23, § 64:89
(“The amount of the deﬁciency judgment is for the amount the indebtedness, with interest and cost
of levy and sale, exceeds the fair value of the property or interest sold as of the date of the sale.”);
Mark S. Pécheck & Kelsey M. Lestor, The ABCs of California Foreclosure Law, L.A. LAW., Jan. 2012,
at 13, 13 (noting that a deﬁciency judgment is available to lenders who opt for judicial foreclosure).
99 Citicorp, 155 F.3d at 1101.
100 Id.
101 645 F.2d 333, 337 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981).
102 Id. at 335.
103 Id. at 336.
104 Id. at 338 (citing cases that have “consistently recognized that review of an order directing
a sale of property may be had . . . only upon an appeal taken from the order of sale”).
105 Id. at 337. The Seventh Circuit precedent on which the Citibank court relied, Central Trust
Co. v. Peoria, D. & E. Railway Co., 118 F. 30 (7th Cir. 1902), was also cited for the same purpose by
Judge Hamilton in his Townsend dissent. See HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Townsend, 793 F.3d 771, 786
(7th Cir. 2015) (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
106 Citibank, 645 F.2d at 338-39.
96
97
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The Eighth Circuit has also embraced the same rule, which it described as
“so indispensable to the protection of the rights of litigants, and of the
purchasers at judicial sales, and to a wise and just administration of the law, that
it ought not to be questioned.”107 In Chase, which dealt with a common law
foreclosure action, the court distinguished prior precedents in which the
foreclosure judgments on appeal were not final by noting that those orders failed
to both definitively determine the mortgagor’s liability and order the sale of
specific property, two features needed to make an order final.108 The court
emphasized that prohibiting appeals of judgments of foreclosure would cause
significant harm: buyers would be reluctant to participate in a foreclosure sale if
the merits decision regarding the defendant’s liability under the mortgage was
not yet final and subject to review and potential reversal.109
Other courts that have weighed in on the issue in less binding and
deﬁnitive ways have favored the view of the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits. The Third Circuit, in a footnote mainly focused on whether a notice
of appeal was timely ﬁled, found that an order of sale (accompanied by or
following an entry of judgment against the homeowner) constituted a ﬁnal,
appealable order.110 Adopting a similar approach, the Tenth Circuit held in
foreclosure actions by the United States government to collect on unpaid
federal taxes that a judgment in favor of the government, accompanied by an
order of sale, was ﬁnal.111 The Eleventh Circuit ruled that an order of
summary judgment for the mortgagee is not ﬁnal until the court orders a

107 Chase v. Driver, 92 F. 780, 784-85, 787 (8th Cir. 1899). Admittedly, the Eighth Circuit has
not cited Chase in over eighty years; however, it does not appear to have overturned it or otherwise
limited its holding, and the Fifth Circuit in Citibank cited Chase with approval. 645 F.2d at 338. The
Eighth Circuit has heard and decided appeals of judgments of foreclosure more recently (albeit
without raising the issue of appealability) in cases such as United States v. Longo, 464 F.2d 913, 914
(8th Cir. 1972), and United States v. Heasley, 283 F.2d 422, 424 (8th Cir. 1960).
108 Chase, 92 F. at 783-86.
109 See id. at 784-85 (noting that the eﬀects of such a rule would be “would be impracticable
and intolerable”).
110 United States v. Bogart, 715 F. App’x 161, 165 n.3 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing, inter alia, Citibank,
645 F.2d at 337).
111 See United States v. Oyer, 461 F. App’x 760, 761-62 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The order of sale was
a ﬁnal order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it resolved all issues remaining before the district court.”
(citing Citibank, 645 F.2d at 337)); United States v. Simons, 419 F. App’x 852, 856 (10th Cir. 2011)
(relying on Citibank and Supreme Court precedents discussed infra notes 176–181 to conclude that a
judgment ﬁnding the defendant liable and the government entitled to foreclosure was not ﬁnal solely
because it did not order the sale of the property). Admittedly, these cases do not contradict the view
of the Seventh Circuit, which also views such orders as ﬁnal. See supra notes 90–93. The Tenth
Circuit’s reasoning and the precedents on which it relies, however, fall squarely in line with the Fifth
Circuit’s analysis. Cf. MTGLQ Inv’rs, LP v. Wellington, No. 19-2162, 2019 WL 8331671, at *1 (10th
Cir. Nov. 25, 2019) (ﬁnding that in a private foreclosure action, the district court’s judgment was not
ﬁnal solely because it did not actually order a foreclosure sale), reh’g denied (Dec. 20, 2019).
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foreclosure sale.112 In dicta, the D.C. Circuit noted that “a decree for a sale
under a mortgage is ﬁnal.”113 Finally, although the Second Circuit itself has
not addressed the issue, the District of Connecticut took the same approach
as these courts in a post-Townsend decision.114
In forging its own finality analysis, the Seventh Circuit in Townsend did not
grapple with the inconsistency between its rationale and that of these other
circuits. Judge Hamilton’s dissent, on the other hand, repeatedly pointed to the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ view in criticizing the majority’s contrary reasoning.115
The Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have yet to respond to Townsend, and the
Supreme Court has declined an invitation to wade into the dispute.116
A panel of the Sixth Circuit, however, squarely rejected the Seventh
Circuit’s appealability analysis.117 In a case involving a corporation’s default on
some of its debts, the district court entered summary judgment noting the
amount that the defendant owed and finding that the mortgagee was entitled
to foreclose and sell the defendant’s properties covered by the mortgages.118
The Sixth Circuit took jurisdiction of the appeal, concluding that the
judgment was final for the purpose of § 1291 because it “determined the rights
and obligations of the parties and lienholders; fixed a certain amount to be
paid to [the plaintiff] that would be supplemented with future interest
accrued, advances made, and other contractual obligations; and identified the
property to be sold in satisfaction of that debt.”119 In justifying this result, the
112 Bank of N.Y. Mellon for Nationstar Home Equity Tr. 2007-A v. Pedersen, No. 16-16893,
2016 WL 10520765, at *1 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2016) (per curiam) (citing Citibank, 645 F.2d at 337).
113 Lynham v. Hufty, 44 App. D.C. 589, 594 (1915) (citing Ray v. Law, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 179,
180 (1805)). Admittedly, this opinion is over a century old, but the court does not appear to have
repudiated its reasoning.
114 See Gallaher v. US Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 14-1877, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36615, at *28 n.7
(D. Conn. Mar. 22, 2016) (concluding that a foreclosure judgment was ﬁnal because it “necessarily
resolved the issues of whether US Bank could properly foreclose on the property, that Plaintiﬀs did
in fact owe the amounts stated in the aﬃdavit of debt,” and that by the conclusion of the redemption
period, the bank had the right to possess the property).
115 See HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Townsend, 793 F.3d 771, 786, 789, 791 (7th Cir. 2015)
(Hamilton, J., dissenting) (“We have not been alone in . . . ﬁnd[ing] that a foreclosure order is ﬁnal
so long as it conclusively establishes the extent of the defendant’s liability for the defaulted loan and
identiﬁes the property to be sold. Both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits have read [precedents] to
establish exactly this rule.” (citing Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir.
1998); Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 645 F.2d 333, 337-38 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981))).
116 The Supreme Court denied Townsend’s petition for writ of certiorari without comment.
Townsend v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 136 S. Ct. 897, 897 (2016). The Court did so even though
Townsend explicitly highlighted the inconsistency between the Seventh Circuit’s decision and those
of the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits in his cert petition. See Brief for Petitioner at 16-19,
Townsend, 136 S. Ct. 897 (No. 15-505), 2015 WL 6153097, at *16-19.
117 MSCI 2007-IQ16 Granville Retail, LLC v. UHA Corp., 660 F. App’x 459, 460 (6th Cir.
2016).
118 See id.
119 Id.
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court explicitly cited Citicorp and Citibank—along with Judge Hamilton’s
dissent in Townsend.120 And as if to further emphasize its disagreement with
the Seventh Circuit’s view, the court also cited—with a negative “but see”
signal—the Townsend majority’s opinion.121
If the circuit split were not sufficiently established after Townsend, the
Sixth Circuit in MSCI laid bare the fundamental disagreement between the
federal courts of appeals as to when a defendant can seek appellate review in
the foreclosure process: the initial order finding a defendant liable for a set
amount of damage and instructing their property to be sold, or the later
judicial confirmation once the sale has taken place.
C. Appealability in State Courts
The federal courts are not the only ones to grapple with the problem of
appealability in foreclosure cases. State courts are not bound by the federal final
judgment requirement, which only governs federal district courts.122 On the flip
side, state law “does not control the resolution of issues governed by federal
statute.”123 Nonetheless, a brief foray into the approaches that state courts have
taken in analyzing when a homeowner can appeal a judgment of foreclosure can
provide a reference point in examining the circuit split fleshed out in the two
prior Sections. It is particularly worthwhile to do so given the emphasis placed
in both Townsend and Martinson on state statutory schemes, as well as the fact
that both opinions acknowledge the view of the relevant state courts on when a
judgment becomes final for purposes of appeal.124 Because many states have

120 Id. (citing Townsend, 793 F.3d at 781-97 (Hamilton, J., dissenting); Citicorp, 155 F.3d at 1101;
Citibank, 645 F.2d at 337-38).
121 Id. (citing Townsend, 793 F.3d at 773-81 (majority opinion)).
122 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018) (discussing jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions of the district
courts” (emphasis added)). Under a separate provision, the Supreme Court also has jurisdiction to review
“[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court[s]” of the states. Id. § 1257(a). Although this
type of Supreme Court review requires a state court to render a final judgment, a judgment that would
not be considered final under the Court’s finality doctrine could nonetheless be appealed within a state’s
own court system, which is governed solely by that state’s procedural rules. Cf. Marcus A. Rowden,
Constitutional Law—Appellate Jurisdiction over State Court Decisions—When Is a State Court Decision “Final,”
51 MICH. L. REV. 1070, 1071 (1953) (“The designation given a judgment by state practice is not controlling
in determining whether [a judgment] is ‘final’ for purposes of federal review, but resort to local law may
be had to determine what effect the judgment has under state rules of practice.”).
123 Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 198-99 (1988) (noting that “Congress
obviously did not mean to borrow or incorporate state law” into federal judicial applications of § 1291).
124 In Townsend, the state courts’ view of ﬁnality supported the court’s own, matching rule. 793
F.3d at 779. In Martinson, the court reached its conclusions while rejecting the state courts’ position
and justiﬁed doing so by stating that ﬁnality in federal courts was a uniquely federal law principle.
Bank of Am., N.A. v. Martinson, 828 F.3d 532, 534-35 (7th Cir. 2016).
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some form of a final judgment rule,125 their views on the issue are analogous
enough to merit exploration, even though they are not bound to interpret their
own finality rules in the same way that the federal courts apply § 1291.
A significant number of states with a final judgment requirement have fallen
in line with the view articulated by the majority of the federal courts of appeals.
These include Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.126 Courts in these states have determined
that orders that determine the rights of the parties and the amount owed and
that order a sale of the mortgaged property are final and can be appealed. Ohio

125 See Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 552 (1932)
(“The basic principle, then, in practically all jurisdictions in this country is that only final judgments
are appealable.”); The Requirement of a Final Judgment or Decree, supra note 62, at 519 (noting that
“within the appellate structure of the state court systems[] . . . there is a general requirement of
finality as a condition to review,” subject to “an elaborate system” of exceptions). States have
established this principle through statutes, court rules, and case law. E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-22-2 (2019);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2101 (2019); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 904.1 (West 2020); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 4-184 (2019); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-301 (West 2020); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 231, § 115 (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-51-3 (2019); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501 (McKinney 2019);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 951, 953 (2019); 210 PA. CODE § 341 (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4103(2)(a) (West 2020); see also infra note 126.
126 See, e.g., Fla. Fertilizer Mfg. Co. v. Hodge, 60 So. 127, 127 (Fla. 1912) (“In judicial proceedings
to foreclose a mortgage, the decree adjudging the equities and directing a sale of the property on default
of payment is the final decree in the cause. Orders confirming sales made under a foreclosure decree are
merely steps taken in the enforcement of the final decree.”); Symon-Ryals Grp., Inc. v. Citizens & S.
Mortg. Co., 334 So. 2d 144, 145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Bahar v. Tadros, 123 N.E.2d 189, 190-91 (Ind.
1954); Stauth v. Brown, 734 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Kan. 1987); L.P.P. Mortg., Ltd. v. Hayse, 87 P.3d 976 (Kan.
Ct. App. 2004) (“An entry of judgment of foreclosure is considered final for purposes of appeal when it
determines the rights of the parties, the amounts to be paid, and the priority of the claims.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)); Schuyler Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Fulmer, 84 N.W. 609, 610 (Neb.
1900) (“It is too clear to need the citation of authorities that a decree in foreclosure cases is a final
judgment.”); Echo Fin. v. Peachtree Props., L.L.C., 864 N.W.2d 695, 700 (Neb. Ct. App. 2015) (holding
that a trial court opinion entering summary judgment for the lender, determining the priority of liens,
and ordering the property to be sold is “a final order for purposes of appeal”); Wells Fargo Bank, NA v.
Garner, 6 A.3d 481, 483 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (“In real estate foreclosure actions, ‘the final
judgment . . . fixes the amount due under the mortgage and directs the sale of the real estate to raise
funds to satisfy the amount due.’” (citation omitted)); CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Roznowski, 11 N.E.3d 1140,
1145-46 (Ohio 2014) (“[A] judgment decree in foreclosure that includes as part of the recoverable damages
amounts advanced by the mortgagee for inspections, appraisals, property protection, and maintenance
but does not include specific itemization of those amounts in the judgment is a final, appealable order.”);
Jones v. England, 782 P.2d 119, 121 (Okla. 1989) (“An order of foreclosure that determines the amount
due is the final order for the purpose of an appeal.”); TBF Fin., LLC v. Gregoire, 118 A.3d 511, 518 (Vt.
2015) (“[A] foreclosure decree is a final judgment even if a right to redeem exists, and even if further
proceedings ancillary to the foreclosure itself are contemplated.”); Anchor Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Coyle,
435 N.W.2d 727, 729-30 (Wis. 1989) (“[T]he judgment of foreclosure and sale disposes of the entire
matter in litigation and is a final judgment appealable as a matter of right . . . .” (citation omitted));
Grieve v. Huber, 283 P. 1105, 1108 (Wyo. 1930) (“It has been held a number of times that a decree directing
the sale of mortgaged or other premises is a final decree from which an appeal may be taken.”).
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has gone slightly further: its courts have held that both the foreclosure order and
the ultimate confirmation of sale are final, appealable judgments.127
On the other hand, Illinois’s courts have taken an alternative approach,
concluding (just like the Seventh Circuit did in Townsend) that “a foreclosure
judgment (and order of sale) is not a ﬁnal and appealable judgment because
it does not dispose of all of the issues between the parties and does not
terminate the litigation.”128
Hawaii’s resolution of the issue, meanwhile, falls into neither of these camps:
its courts allow immediate appeals of foreclosure orders but assert jurisdiction
over them under the collateral order doctrine,129 rather than under the classical
formulation of the final judgment rule.130
Therefore, state courts, just like the federal courts of appeals, have split on
the issue of whether an order of foreclosure constitutes a final order for
purposes of appeal. Nonetheless, the heavily prevailing rule appears to be the
same one as in the federal appellate courts: a judgment finding liability, setting
the amount owed, and ordering a foreclosure sale is final and appealable.
III. DIMENSIONS OF DISAGREEMENT: EVALUATING THE APPROACHES
TO FINALITY FOR PURPOSES OF APPEAL IN FORECLOSURE CASES
The view of the majority of the courts of appeals better comports with the
nature of the foreclosure process and more faithfully adheres to Supreme Court
precedent than does that of the Seventh Circuit. Under the prevailing rule
among the courts of appeals, a foreclosure order determining that the defendant
is liable, setting the amount of damages, and ordering the sale of a specific piece
127 See Farmers State Bank v. Sponaugle, 133 N.E.3d 470, 476 (Ohio 2019) (noting that for
judgments of foreclosure and sale, “[i]f a dispute as to the final amounts due does arise, then parties may
challenge those amounts by appealing the confirmation of sale”); Roznowski, 11 N.E.3d at 1145-46 (holding
that a judgment decree in foreclosure is a final order).
128 CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Sharlow, 4 N.E.3d 580, 587 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014); accord EMC Mortg.
Corp. v. Kemp, 982 N.E.2d 152, 154 (Ill. 2012) (“[A] judgment ordering the foreclosure of mortgage
is not ﬁnal and appealable until the trial court enters an order approving the sale and directing the
distribution.”). But cf. FDIC v. Barrick, No. 13-50221, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150447, at *7 n.4 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 22, 2014) (acknowledging that Illinois state courts nonetheless allow an appeal of a
foreclosure judgment when the trial court makes a ﬁnding under ILL. SUP. CT. R. 304(a) that there
is no just reason to delay an appeal of the order).
129 See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text.
130 See Beneficial Haw., Inc. v. Casey, 45 P.3d 359, 365 (Haw. 2002) (permitting an appeal of a
foreclosure decree and its accompanying orders “even though there may be additional proceedings
remaining in the circuit court” because it is considered a collateral order). Hawaii state courts, in addition
to adopting the collateral order doctrine from federal precedents, follow a final judgment rule, HAW.
REV. STAT. § 641-1(a) (2019), and appear to follow Supreme Court precedents on this issue such as
Whiting v. Bank of the United States, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 6, 15 (1839), discussed infra note 135 and text
accompanying notes 177–179. See Int’l Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Woods, 731 P.2d 151, 154-55 (Haw. 1987)
(relying on and applying the holdings in both Whiting and Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541 (1949)).
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of property is a final judgment that can be appealed. If the defendant has a
reinstatement right under applicable law, the judgment becomes final either on
the date that he disclaims his intent to reinstate the mortgage or at the end of
the reinstatement period, but his appeal of the foreclosure order is still proper.
A. Foreclosure as a Complicated Route to Damages
The function of foreclosure is quite similar in important ways to the process
of executing on a damages award.131 The majority approach among the courts of
appeals more faithfully incorporates this nature of foreclosure orders.
It is clear that in a suit for monetary relief, an order by the court finding
the defendant liable and ordering him to pay the plaintiff a fixed amount of
damages is generally a final judgment.132 If the defendant is unable or
unwilling to provide the money, the court can issue a writ of execution, which
requires a government official (such as a sheriff) to take possession of the
defendant’s property and sell as much of it as needed to cover the amount
owed to the plaintiff.133 Despite the complexity that this process may entail,
the Supreme Court in Bell v. New Jersey held that even if a judgment “is not
self-executing and [the plaintiff] may have to undertake further proceedings
131 Cf. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Townsend, 793 F.3d 771, 784 (7th Cir. 2015) (Hamilton, J.,
dissenting) (describing finality in foreclosure as a “specialized application” of the analysis involved in the
“simpler case of a suit on an unsecured debt”); In re Sorenson, 77 F.2d 166, 167 (7th Cir. 1935) (“[M]atters
incident to the execution of the decree—the sale, report of sale, deficiency decree, redemption . . . and
the like—are to the decree of foreclosure what at law the execution, sale, redemption, and the like are to
the final judgment to which they are incidental.”); United States v. Birdsong, No. 17-0072, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 34082, at *3 (D. Mont. Mar. 4, 2019) (describing foreclosure as “merely a mechanism to enforce
the money judgment”); Shuput v. Lauer, 325 N.W.2d 321, 326 (Wis. 1982) (characterizing foreclosure sale
and confirmation proceedings as “more logically . . . an execution of judgment”). In fleshing out this
analogy, Judge Hamilton in his dissent makes the following argument:

Suppose P sues D for breach of a promissory note. P wins a judgment ordering D to pay
X dollars to P. That judgment is final and appealable. It is final and appealable even though
D may choose simply to pay the judgment, and even though, if D does not pay, P may
need the court’s help to identify D’s property and then to seize and sell it to satisfy the
judgment. The judgment is final even if we do not yet know exactly how the judgment
will be executed . . . . With a secured loan, the fact that the property available for execution
has already been identified does not prevent the underlying judgment on the merits (“D
shall pay P the sum of X Dollars”) from being final and appealable.
Townsend, 793 F.3d at 784.
132 See, e.g., United States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 233 (1958) (noting
that “it is obvious that a ﬁnal judgment for money must, at least, determine, or specify the means
for determining, the amount”).
133 See FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(1) (“A money judgment is enforced by a writ of execution, unless the
court directs otherwise.”); see also DUNAWAY, supra note 23, § 21:10 (describing how, in an execution sale,
“(1) the plaintiff obtains a general judgment against the defendant; (2) if the defendant does not pay the
judgment, the plaintiff may request a writ of execution from the clerk of the court, and (3) a public official
sells enough of the defendant’s property to satisfy the judgment”).
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to collect the damages awarded, that possibility does not prevent appellate
review of the decision, which is final.”134
Foreclosure can be viewed as a simplified version of the execution process.135
Although an order of foreclosure may seem to be an injunctive remedy because
it results in actions being taken rather than money being paid, it is at its heart
monetary in nature.136 In fact, an order directing a foreclosure sale under a
mortgage does not count as an injunction for the purposes of interlocutory
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).137 In these lawsuits, the lending institution
is not interested in the sale of the property per se; it simply seeks to do so
because it wants to obtain the monetary proceeds of that sale (and of any
deficiency judgment) to satisfy the debt that it is owed. The amount of damages
it seeks to recover is set ahead of time by the loan agreement, and the foreclosure
process is merely an efficient way for it to obtain that money.138 As a result, as
in a suit for damages, a judgment finding the defendant liable and ordering him
to pay a set amount to the plaintiff (here, through the vehicle of a foreclosure
sale to obtain that amount) is final under § 1291.
There may actually be less left to be determined following an order of
foreclosure than there is after a standard judgment that necessitates execution
proceedings.139 In a foreclosure sale, the parties have already stipulated in
advance what property would be sold to satisfy the debt should the homeowner
default on the loan through the terms of their contract. As a result, the court
does not have to consider whether a sale of property is necessary to obtain the
money owed, nor does the sheriff have to make any decisions about what land
or property to sell. Otherwise, the process is the same.
134 461 U.S. 773, 779 (1983); cf. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 38, § 3909 (pointing to many
Supreme Court cases that find the finality requirement satisfied as long as all that remains to do after
the order is to “execute the judgment or perform other ministerial tasks”).
135 The Supreme Court has endorsed this view in passing. See N.C. R.R. Co. v. Swasey, 90 U.S.
(23 Wall.) 405, 409 (1874) (“The sale in [a foreclosure] case is the execution of the decree.”); Whiting v.
Bank of the U.S., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 6, 15 (1839) (noting that “ulterior proceedings” following a judgment
of foreclosure “are but a mode of executing the original decree, like the award of an execution at law”).
136 Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Cornish, 759 F. App’x 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2019) (“At the core of a
foreclosure judgment is a judgment simply ordering the borrower to repay a money debt.”); cf. id. at 508
(concluding that only the final order confirming the sale and directing turnover of the property to the
buyer “introduce[s] the injunctive elements into the judgment”).
137 16 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 38, § 3922 (citing HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Townsend, 793
F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2015)).
138 In all of the key foreclosure finality cases discussed in this Comment, the district courts’
foreclosure orders set out the amount of money that the defendants owe. Cf. id. § 3915.2 (noting that a
failure by the court to determine the amount of damages owed can prevent an order from being final).
139 See id. § 3915.4 (“The steps required for execution [of a foreclosure judgment] may be more
nearly routine than the steps involved in successfully executing a simple money judgment.”); cf. Cornish,
759 F. App’x at 507 (noting that for mortgage foreclosures, “the execution to put money in the lender’s
pocket should actually be simpler than with a general money judgment. The difference is that the lender
already has its security interest in the mortgaged property”).
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The normal execution process may actually be baked into a statutory
foreclosure scheme. A deficiency judgment, when awarded after the foreclosure
sale, reflects a recognition that the sale did not yield enough money to satisfy
the judgment and seeks to recover the remainder from the defendant
personally. As a result, much like other money judgments, if the defendant fails
to pay the deficiency judgment, a court may order an execution sale of other
property owned by the defendant to secure the amount that the lender is
owed.140 The execution of the deficiency judgment is thus just a second step in
securing the damages award at the heart of a foreclosure case: if selling off the
mortgaged property fails to raise the full amount that the defendant owes, the
court may then order a sale of other property to make up for the difference (if
necessary, through a standard execution sale).
Despite these similarities, the Townsend majority based its conclusion in part
on a concern that after an order of foreclosure, the homeowner could reinstate
or redeem the mortgage, rendering the order meaningless.141 The potential
exercise of these rights, however, does not defeat the finality of the judgment.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a useful analogue (in particular,
to redemption): Rule 60 allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment
that has been “satisfied, released, or discharged.”142 This condition may be met
in certain cases where a party has paid the amount of damages it owes.143 The
express language of this Rule explicitly contemplates a court reaching a final
judgment and later setting it aside. In addition, Rule 68(c) allows a party to
make an “offer of judgment” even after the court has determined liability.144
140 See Townsend, 793 F.3d at 781 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (comparing the process of resolving
any need for a deficiency judgment as analogous to disputes in other execution proceedings and noting
that “[t]he routine arithmetic needed to calculate the amount of a deficiency judgment or postjudgment interest also does not undermine finality when those calculations follow mechanically from
a judgment that determines the total amount owed and the priorities of creditors”); cf. DUNAWAY,
supra note 23, § 16:46 (noting that when a court orders a deficiency judgment, the lender “is entitled
to obtain a writ of execution and cause the borrower’s property to be sold at an execution sale”).
141 Townsend, 793 F.3d at 775 (noting that these rights have “the potential to undo the foreclosure,
scuttling the need for the process of executing the judgment”). But see id. at 787 (Hamilton, J., dissenting)
(arguing that these open issues affect the execution, not the merits, of the district court’s judgment).
142 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5).
143 See, e.g., Payne v. Tri-State Careflight, LLC, No. 14-1044, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43374, at *95
(D.N.M. Mar. 16, 2019) (“Courts grant rule 60(b)(5) motions to relieve an owing party of its obligations
under the judgment when the party has contributed to or fully satisfied the judgment.”); John W.
Johnson, Inc. v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 369 F. Supp. 484, 498 (E.D. Va. 1973) (granting a Rule 60(b)(5)
motion because the third-party defendant had paid the amount in damages it owed to the third-party
plaintiff); see also 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 38, § 2863 (compiling cases).
144 FED. R. CIV. P. 68(c). In a diﬀerent context, the Supreme Court has suggested, but has not
deﬁnitively held, that a defendant may be able to moot ongoing litigation by depositing the full
amount of the plaintiﬀ ’s individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiﬀ. See Campbell-Ewald
Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016); see also id. at 680, 683 (Roberts, J., dissenting). If this were
permissible, it would occur prior to any ﬁnal judgment, but it nonetheless suggests that a plaintiﬀ ’s
claim can be fully satisﬁed in ways beyond the sought-after process.
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This principle is at odds with the Seventh Circuit’s rationale. The court in
Townsend found that the order of foreclosure was not final precisely because it
could later be set aside if the homeowner exercised his right of reinstatement or
redemption.145 Given the ultimate monetary nature of the remedy sought in a
foreclosure case, however, reinstatement and redemption can be seen as an
alternative method of providing the plaintiff with that remedy. Once the court
conclusively holds the defendant liable and determines how much he owes,
redemption of the mortgage merely serves as another way to satisfy that
judgment. While the lender is entitled to utilize the foreclosure method to
obtain the amount it is owed, the defendant can provide that amount in cash to
redeem the loan and equally meet its obligation under the judgment.
Reinstatement may be a little less easy to square within this framework.
Admittedly, reinstatement deprives the lender of his right under the loan
agreement to collect the full amount of the debt up front upon default. The
real “harm” that the lender-plaintiff in a foreclosure case has suffered, however,
is the homeowner-defendant’s failure to make the required payment; curing
that default still undoes the harm to some extent by returning both parties to
the circumstances that existed prior to the default.146 But even if reinstatement
cannot be placed within the analogy between the foreclosure process and the
execution of a money judgment, a foreclosure order allowing for reinstatement
of the mortgage can still be reconciled with existing finality doctrine.
A number of cases have allowed for the appeal of a decision contingent on
some future event by relating the notice of appeal forward to the time when
the condition is either fulfilled or not met.147 That is, when a district court
issues a decision conditioned on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of some
future event, an appeal filed from that decision is proper. To make this
possible, the court of appeals simply treats the notice of appeal as if it was filed
on the date when the appellant either failed to fulfill the condition or
disclaimed his intent to fulfill it—which is the time when the district court’s
order became final.148
Townsend, 793 F.3d at 775.
See id. at 781 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (“[W]e see that the statutory provisions for
redemption and reinstatement are merely specialized instances of the right any defendant has to
satisfy a judgment voluntarily before it is executed.”); id. at 788 (“Having more than one choice for
how to satisfy a judgment is commonplace. It does not undermine the finality of that judgment.”).
147 See 16A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 38, § 3950.5 & nn.23-27 (“[N]otice of appeal ﬁled
after the contingent decision but before the expiration of the contingency period should relate
forward to the time when the plaintiﬀ has failed (or, in some instances, has disclaimed intent) to
fulﬁl [sic] the relevant condition.”).
148 Id.; see also, e.g., Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 648 n.3 (7th Cir. 2017)
(holding that a plaintiﬀ properly appealed a dismissal with leave to amend the complaint because
the notice of appeal related forward to the subsequent order dismissing with prejudice after the
plaintiﬀ failed to seek leave to amend within the allotted time period); Slayton v. Am. Express Co.,
145
146
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Extending that logic to the foreclosure context, a foreclosure order in a case
where the defendant has a right of reinstatement ripens into a final judgment
when the right of reinstatement expires or the defendant disclaims his intent to
exercise the right. Appealing the foreclosure order would still be proper, as the
notice of appeal would relate forward to the date when the defendant fails to
fulfill the condition on which the order depends (the exercise of the
reinstatement right). And if the defendant is able to reinstate the mortgage, of
course, he then retains possession of his home and the mortgage remains
operational. Thus, even if reinstatement cannot be squared with the analogy to
the execution of a standard money judgment, it is still possible to reconcile it
with standard final judgment principles. The judgment of foreclosure remains
appealable under this view even if the defendant has a right of reinstatement. It
ripens into a final judgment at the time when either the defendant’s window for
reinstatement expires or the defendant disclaims his right to reinstate, rather
than doing so instantaneously. Nonetheless, the defendant’s ability to seek
appellate review of the foreclosure order remains unaffected. If courts adopt this
approach, one way to facilitate the logistics of the process is to have the court
clerk hold the appeal in abeyance149 and suspend its progress until either the end
of the reinstatement period or the defendant’s disclaimer of intent to reinstate.
But other than reinstatement, all of the other potential events that may
follow a foreclosure order—the execution of the foreclosure sale, the court’s
confirmation of the sale, the issuance of a deficiency judgment, and the
defendant’s ability to redeem the mortgage—can be understood as together
comprising an elaborate means of executing the final judgment. Thus, a
judgment of foreclosure is ultimately a more nuanced version of a standard final
judgment of liability in a case seeking damages. It sets out precisely how those
damages will be collected and allows for several alternative ways of satisfying
the liability and remedying the monetary harm that the lender has endured.150
The Seventh Circuit, in failing to recognize the analogy, instead overemphasizes
the complexity of the process of execution that awaits parties after the
foreclosure judgment, an issue to which I turn in the next Section.
460 F.3d 215, 222-25 (2d Cir. 2006) (ﬁnding that a judgment dismissing a case with leave to amend
became ﬁnal when the plaintiﬀs disclaimed their intent to amend their complaint and concluding
that ﬁling the notice of appeal after the initial judgment was proper).
149 The federal courts of appeals have the power to hold an appeal in abeyance, a tactic that
suspends the litigation for a certain period of time. See United States v. Outen, 286 F.3d 622, 631 &
n.6 (2d Cir. 2002) (arguing that courts have the authority to do so as part of their power under
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(b) to extend the time for an appeal); Abeyance, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (deﬁning the term as a “[t]emporary inactivity” or “suspension”);
cf. 16AA WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 38, § 3968.1 (referencing the power of a court of appeals
to hold an appeal in abeyance until the appellant ﬁles a certiﬁcate of appealability).
150 Cf. Townsend, 793 F.3d at 781 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (referring to the foreclosure process
as involving a “specialized application” of usual principles).
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B. Bright-Line Rules and the Nuances of State Law
A significant portion of the Seventh Circuit’s Townsend analysis is grounded
in principles of Illinois state law governing foreclosure and in particular the
statutory provisions allowing for deficiency judgments and redemption and
reinstatement rights.151 In fact, HSBC Bank, in its brief in opposition to
Townsend’s petition for Supreme Court review, argued that no circuit split exists
on the issue.152 In doing so, it distinguished cases such as Citibank and Citicorp
by contending that they dealt with foreclosure schemes different from Illinois’s
or only discussed finality in dicta.153 However, the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on
the intricacies of state law, without fully accounting for how federal finality
doctrine applies to them,154 is misplaced and ultimately results in a rule that is
inconsistent with the need for bright-line tests in determining appealability.
The final judgment rule is a distinctly federal concept, designed only to
govern cases in the federal judicial system.155 The Seventh Circuit
acknowledged this in both Townsend and Martinson when it indicated that it
intended to establish a federal standard of finality.156 The particular federal
concerns inherent in the final judgment requirement of § 1291 weigh against
placing too much weight on state law in deciding questions of finality, as state
law “does not control the resolution of issues governed by federal statute.”157
Admittedly, there is a somewhat compelling argument to be made for the
role of state law here. Foreclosure involves the ownership and sale of real
property, an area of law that traditionally has been left up to local and state
governance.158 In addition, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly
require that the execution of a judgment comport with applicable state
151 See id. at 775-78 (majority opinion) (“Illinois law speciﬁes the various steps that must be
taken; it is the governing law in this diversity action, and so we must see how the district court’s
actions ﬁt into the regime Illinois creates for foreclosures.”).
152 See Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11-14, Townsend v. HSBC
Bank USA, N.A., 136 S. Ct. 897 (2016) (No. 15-505), 2015 WL 9252237, at *11-14 (“[T]he Petitioner,
HSBC, and the Seventh Circuit have all failed to cite or ﬁnd a single court that has issued a
conﬂicting decision involving a statutory judicial foreclosure scheme similar to the IMFL.”).
153 Id.
154 For a discussion of how Townsend fails to comport with Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit
precedents, see infra Section III.C.
155 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018) (governing only “ﬁnal decisions of the district courts of the
United States”); see also Bank of Am., N.A. v. Martinson, 828 F.3d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting
that ﬁnality is “a procedural issue governed by federal law”).
156 Martinson, 828 F.3d at 534-35; Townsend, 793 F.3d at 777 (noting that “the state’s view of
ﬁnality for state-law purposes does not dictate the result for federal appellate jurisdiction”).
157 Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 198-99 (1988) (“In using the phrase
‘ﬁnal decisions’ Congress obviously did not mean to borrow or incorporate state law.”).
158 See Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1945) (“Concepts of real
property are deeply rooted in state traditions, customs, habits, and laws.”); 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 38, § 4520 (noting that in cases involving property interests, state law often has a role to play in
formulating the rule of decision even when there are significant federal interests).
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procedures—one of the few areas where the Rules mention state law.159 As a
result, one might contend that accounting for state foreclosure law fairly reflects
the states’ roles in this space. In fact, there is a strong argument for determining
the final judgment rule’s application to foreclosures in a way that accounts for
state statutory reinstatement provisions, as previously discussed.160
The Seventh Circuit in Townsend (and the cases that followed it), however,
relied too heavily on the precise details of state law in developing what it
deemed to be a federal standard, without fully wrestling with how to treat those
state-law features under federal finality doctrine. The Townsend opinion, in its
§ 1291 analysis, focused almost exclusively on Illinois foreclosure law, relying
heavily on narrow provisions in the statutory framework, and devoted relatively
little space to discussing federal precedents governing final judgments.161 The
court’s decision in Martinson took a similar tack.162 In fact, the Townsend court’s
ultimate rule for determining finality in a foreclosure case hinged entirely on
evaluating the relevant state law provisions and the processes they set out
governing the defendant’s rights and the foreclosure sale and confirmation
process.163 In fashioning such a rule, the court did not extensively strive to
justify why, under federal finality doctrine, those provisions prevented the
foreclosure order from being final. The Townsend line of cases thus emphasized
certain features of state law but did not fully analyze whether those components
rendered the foreclosure order nonfinal under the federal standard.
In placing such significant weight on the particularities of state law, the
Townsend approach also presents cause for concern in light of the preference
in federal appealability jurisprudence for straightforward, easily applicable
rules. The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he time of appealability, having
jurisdictional consequences, should above all be clear.”164 In its view, both
courts and litigants are best served by bright-line rules.165 The Seventh Circuit
itself has rightly and repeatedly acknowledged that the final judgment rule

FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(1).
See supra notes 147–149 and accompanying text.
Townsend, 793 F.3d at 775-78.
Bank of Am., N.A. v. Martinson, 828 F.3d 532, 534-35 (7th Cir. 2016).
Townsend, 793 F.3d at 775-77; see also Martinson, 828 F.3d at 533 (summarizing Townsend’s holding
as relying on three factors: the presence of statutory rights to redemption and reinstatement; the need
for judicial confirmation of the foreclosure sale; and the determination of a deficiency judgment, all of
which were based on Illinois statutory law).
164 Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202 (1988).
165 Id.; cf. Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion: Discretionary Review of Interlocutory
Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 201-02 (2001) (arguing, in response to Budinich, that even the
exceptions to the ﬁnal judgment rule that the Court has recognized have been made “relatively clear
and easy” for courts and parties to apply and understand).
159
160
161
162
163
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falls within “an area of procedure and practice where there should be a
premium on clarity.”166
As Judge Hamilton’s dissent makes clear, the Townsend approach fails to
adhere to these principles.167 The majority opinion set out a three-factor
balancing test based on the particularities of Illinois’s statutory scheme without
clarifying the significance of each factor or addressing whether courts can
consider other factors in assessing finality under other foreclosure schemes.
Even in the few cases that have followed it, implementing the test has
proven unwieldy. For instance, in Martinson, the Seventh Circuit struggled to
apply Townsend’s rule to Wisconsin foreclosure law when only two of the three
factors were present and ultimately decided that the absence of one of those
features, the statutory provision allowing for deficiency judgments, should not
be dispositive.168 The court also did not address the relevance of the right of
reinstatement in Wisconsin’s statutory scheme to its determination even
though it found that right important in its analysis of Illinois’s foreclosure
system in Townsend. As a result, litigants in Indiana (the third state in the
Seventh Circuit) or in any other jurisdiction that adopts the Townsend approach
lack a clear framework around which they can structure their affairs.169 They
cannot predict ex ante when they will be able to appeal a judgment in the
foreclosure process (and potentially obtain a stay pending that appeal), which
can have significant ramifications for them.170 For instance, California’s
foreclosure process, the statutory scheme at issue in Citicorp, meets two of the
Townsend factors (redemption and reinstatement rights and the possibility of a
166 Martinson, 828 F.3d at 534; see also, e.g., In re Kilgus, 811 F.2d 1112, 1117 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The
more mechanical the application of a jurisdictional rule, the better. The chief and often the only
virtue of a jurisdictional rule is clarity.” (internal citations omitted)); Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi. v.
Daniels, 763 F.2d 286, 292 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The ﬁrst characteristic of a good jurisdictional rule is
predictability and uniform application.”).
167 See Townsend, 793 F.3d at 782-83 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (“The majority opinion does not
tell us what to do in a case presenting only one or two of the three issues it thinks defeat finality.”).
168 Martinson, 828 F.3d at 534 (noting that the “Townsend majority opinion was not speciﬁc
about how its holding might have been aﬀected by a change in any of the factors it relied upon” and
subsequently striving to determine “[w]hat seems to have concerned the Townsend court most”). But
cf. United States v. Williams, 796 F.3d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that the applicable federal
statute does not provide for deﬁciency judgments, in ﬁnding that the IRS tax lien foreclosure
scheme yields a ﬁnal judgment upon the entry of a judgment of foreclosure).
169 Cf. Republic Nat. Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 69 (1948) (“The considerations that
determine ﬁnality are not abstractions but have reference to very real interests—not merely those
of the immediate parties, but more particularly, those that pertain to the smooth functioning of our
judicial system.”).
170 For instance, if, as in Williams, the judgment of foreclosure is ﬁnal under a certain scheme,
waiting until the conﬁrmation order to challenge that judgment may lead the appellant to
inadvertently waive his right to contest the merits of the judgment. See Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease
Fin. Corp., 645 F.2d 333, 338 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981) (listing cases that “have consistently
recognized that review of an order directing a sale of property may be had only upon an appeal taken
from the order of sale and not upon an appeal from the subsequent conﬁrmation”).
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deficiency judgment171). These are not the same two factors that were present
in Martinson, so it is far from obvious, absent further analysis by the Seventh
Circuit, how the facts of Citicorp would fare under the Townsend analysis.
By contrast, the approach of the other courts of appeals provides a clear
dividing line between final and nonfinal orders in line with the Supreme Court’s
guidance. As long as the foreclosure order indicates the amount of the
defendant’s liability and specifies the property to be sold (both of which can
easily be identified from the face of the judgment), the defendant can appeal
it.172 Even a slightly more complex rule, in which such a judgment is final and
appealable unless the defendant has a right of reinstatement that he can exercise
after the foreclosure order (but ripens into a final judgment upon the lapse or
waiver of the right173) still provides clarity to litigants. Parties can determine
with relative ease whether they can appeal a court order or whether they must
instead wait until later in the process to seek review of the judgment. The rule
minimizes the risk that a litigant loses his chance of obtaining appellate review
by erroneously waiting to file an appeal until the issuance of a later order.
This difference between the two approaches to finality is particularly
significant given that state foreclosure law remains in flux. Some states are
considering requiring the use of judicial foreclosure; others are exploring
modifying the statutory frameworks that govern foreclosures.174 Any
significant shifts in a state’s foreclosure statutes could create even greater
uncertainty for homeowners facing default, as a Townsend-like standard would
require courts to reevaluate finality anytime that the underlying foreclosure
process changes. As a result, and especially given the significant implications
that a foreclosure proceeding has on a defendant homeowner,175 it is particularly
crucial to establish a consistent, bright-line rule of finality in foreclosure cases
to provide certainty to litigants, rather than relying on a principle of finality
that is overly encumbered with the particularities of state law.

See supra text accompanying notes 97–98.
MSCI 2007-IQ16 Granville Retail, LLC v. UHA Corp., 660 F. App’x 459, 460 (6th Cir. 2016);
Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1998); Citibank, 645 F.2d at 338.
173 See supra text accompanying notes 147–149.
174 See, e.g., Colleen O’Dea, Trenton Tackles NJ’s Foreclosure Rate, Down but Still Highest in the
Nation, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.njspotlight.com/stories/19/03/26/trentontackles-njs-stubborn-foreclosure-rate-down-but-still-highest-in-nation/ [https://perma.cc/E2ZU-E
ZG7] (discussing a package of bills recently passed by the New Jersey legislature that would reform
the state’s foreclosure process in order to make it more eﬃcient and homeowner-friendly); Bob
Sanders, NH House Votes to Require Court Involvement in Foreclosure Process, N.H. BUS. REV. (Feb.
20, 2019), https://www.nhbr.com/nh-house-votes-to-require-court-involvement-in-foreclosure-pro
cess/ [https://perma.cc/UTZ2-ZQTV] (discussing a recently passed bill in the New Hampshire
House of Representatives that would require mortgagees to seek judicial foreclosure in the state).
175 See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
171
172
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C. Townsend in Light of Prior Precedent
Finally, the other circuits more faithfully conform their views of
appealability with the standards articulated by the Supreme Court (and by prior
Seventh Circuit opinions) than does the Townsend decision. Beyond setting out
general principles of what makes a judgment final or not final, the majority
opinion in Townsend did not devote significant energy to squaring its conclusion
with any prior rulings on the issue. By contrast, the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits firmly grounded their reasoning in the Court’s precedents.
From very early on in its history, the Supreme Court has held that “a decree
for a sale under a mortgage, is such a final decree as may be appealed from.”176
Most prominently, in Whiting v. Bank of the United States, the Court dealt with
the question of whether a decree of foreclosure and sale was final and appealable,
or whether the judgment only became final when the court confirmed the sale.177
The Court firmly held that it was the former order that was final.178 The
judgment of foreclosure decided the merits of the case, while the sale process
and what came after it were merely “ulterior proceedings” to execute on the
initial judgment—just like the “the award of an execution at law” of money
damages.179 The Court continued to apply this approach in other cases
throughout the nineteenth century,180 although it has not revisited the issue in
some time. These prior opinions did not establish a rule that a foreclosure order
is always final. Rather, they made clear that such a judgment satisfies the finality
requirement as long as the amount of liability and the property to be foreclosed
are set out in the opinion and the court orders that a sale take place.181
In fact, the Seventh Circuit’s own precedents have taken the same position.
In several twentieth-century decisions, the court addressed finality in
foreclosure litigation. The court in In re Sorenson concluded that “a decree which
definitely fixes and adjudicates, as between the parties to the litigation, all issues
relating to their mutual rights and obligations” is final, and it determined that

Ray v. Law, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 179, 180 (1805).
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 6, 15 (1839).
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., McGourkey v. Toledo & Ohio Cent. Ry. Co., 146 U.S. 536, 545 (1892); Grant v.
Phx. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 106 U.S. 429, 431 (1882) (“It has also been many times decided that a decree
of sale in a foreclosure suit, which settles all the rights of the parties and leaves nothing to be done
but to make the sale and pay out the proceeds, is a ﬁnal decree for the purposes of an appeal.”);
Bronson v. La Crosse & M.R. Co., 67 U.S. 524, 531 (1862) (noting that “this Court has decided that
a decree for the sale of mortgaged premises is a ﬁnal decree from which an appeal lies”).
181 E.g., McGourkey, 146 U.S. at 545-46, 550; Burlington, Cedar Rapids & N. Ry. Co. v.
Simmons, 123 U.S. 52, 54 (1887); N.C. R.R. Co. v. Swasey, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 405, 409-10 (1874); cf.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 742 (1976) (noting in another context that a lack of a
speciﬁed damages amount can defeat ﬁnality).
176
177
178
179
180
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the “usual decree of foreclosure” satisfies this test.182 Even though the
foreclosure scheme may have been different at the time, it bore many similarities
to the present Illinois system. The Sorenson court acknowledged that a deficiency
decree and redemption (two of the factors that defeated the finality of the
foreclosure order in Townsend) may follow the judgment of foreclosure, but it
held that they are merely incident to the execution of the order.183
The Seventh Circuit’s decisions in Townsend and its progeny unfortunately
do not seek to distinguish or even acknowledge these cases. On the other hand,
Judge Hamilton’s dissent in Townsend and the Citibank, Citicorp, and MSCI
opinions all rely heavily on them.184 As a result, the latter approach is more in
line with longstanding finality doctrine, as well as with the true nature of
foreclosure as a method of executing a judgment and the need for bright-line
rules to govern appellate jurisdiction.
IV. TOWARD A UNIFORM VIEW OF FINALITY: RESOLVING THE
DISCORD AMONG THE COURTS OF APPEALS
The inconsistency between the Seventh Circuit’s approach to finality in
foreclosure cases following Townsend and that of the other courts of appeals
requires resolution, especially given the severe consequences that jurisdictional
rules in this setting can have on litigants.185 In this Part, I propose several
avenues that can be used to remedy this situation. The first solution is through
a traditional judicial resolution of the circuit split in the courts. The second
involves the powers bestowed on the Supreme Court by the Rules Enabling Act
to “prescribe general rules of practice and procedure” in the district and
appellate courts.186 The third entails congressional intervention. I address each
of these in turn.

182 In re Sorenson, 77 F.2d 166, 167 (7th Cir. 1935); see also In re Lowmon, 79 F.2d 887, 890 (7th
Cir. 1935) (reaffirming that “a decree of foreclosure constitute[s a] final decree, and that it adjudicate[s],
as between the parties to the litigation, all issues relating to their mutual rights and obligations”); Cent.
Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. Peoria, D. & E. Ry. Co., 118 F. 30, 30 (7th Cir. 1902) (holding that the validity of a
decree of foreclosure cannot be challenged on an appeal from the order confirming the sale and
implying that a mortgagor must do so by appealing the foreclosure order).
183 Sorenson, 77 F.2d at 167.
184 HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Townsend, 793 F.3d 771, 784-87 (7th Cir. 2015) (Hamilton, J.,
dissenting); see also MSCI 2007-IQ16 Granville Retail, LLC v. UHA Corp., 660 F. App’x 459, 460
(6th Cir. 2016); Citicorp Real Estate v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1998); Citibank, N.A. v.
Data Lease Fin. Corp., 645 F.2d 333, 337-38 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981).
185 See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
186 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2018).
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A. Judicial Branch
Given that this case involves the question of what cases federal courts can
hear, it seems only natural that the courts can resolve the circuit split.
1. Judicial Decisionmaking
The simplest route to handle the circuit split is through a court ruling. This
can come about in two different ways. The Seventh Circuit could choose to
reexamine Townsend of its own accord and bring its opinions in line with those
of the other circuits.187 The more likely, and much more logical, mechanism to
resolve the issue is through the Supreme Court. A ruling by the Court would
not only resolve the disagreement among the courts of appeals but also do so
in a way that lays down a nationwide standard. One of the factors that the Court
considers in deciding whether to grant a petition for a writ of certiorari, after
all, is the presence of a circuit split.188
The Court has previously declined to declare which of the competing views
on this issue is correct.189 Since then, however, the Sixth Circuit explicitly
rejected the Townsend approach, making the split even more apparent,190 which
may make the Court more likely now to intervene. Admittedly, the Sixth
Circuit’s decision made the split even more lopsided, with four circuits firmly
on one side and only one on the other. So it is possible that the Seventh Circuit
would be more inclined, in light of MSCI, to reconsider its view and overturn
Townsend without any intervention from the Supreme Court. While this is
certainly possible, the court may be unenthusiastic about walking back a
standard that it laid out only four years ago and has since applied repeatedly,
and any reconsideration on its part may take some time.
187 Admittedly, this might be a bit tricky, since almost all courts of appeals adhere to the doctrine
of stare decisis and have adopted rules preventing three-judge panels from overturning a precedential
opinion by a prior panel. Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEV.
L.J. 787, 796-97 (2012). The Seventh Circuit, however, takes a more flexible approach, allowing panels to
overrule each other as long as the overturning opinion is circulated among all of the judges of the circuit
in advance of publication and a majority of them do not vote to rehear the case en banc. 7TH CIR. R.
40(e); Mead, supra, at 794 n.54 (describing the Seventh Circuit’s approach to stare decisis); see also, e.g.,
United States v. Reyes-Hernandez, 624 F.3d 405, 412-13 (7th Cir. 2010) (overturning a prior circuit
precedent in a decision by a three-judge panel and explaining the court’s power to do so).
188 See SUP. CT. R. 10(a) (noting that one of the considerations governing review on certiorari
is whether “a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conﬂict with the decision of
another United States court of appeals on the same important matter”).
189 The Court, without comment, denied Townsend’s petition for writ of certiorari, which
squarely presented the question this Comment addresses. Townsend v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 136
S. Ct. 897, 897 (2016).
190 See MSCI 2007-IQ16 Granville Retail, LLC v. UHA Corp., 660 F. App’x 459, 460 (6th Cir.
2016) (concluding that a judgment of foreclosure was a ﬁnal judgment over which the court of
appeals had jurisdiction).
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Absent a change of heart from the Seventh Circuit, resolution by the
Supreme Court will obviously require litigants to present the Court with the
issue. This means a case that raises the question of appellate jurisdiction on
similar facts needs to present itself (or a court needs to address it of its own
accord191). If the Court receives a cert petition on such a case and grants it, the
Court should resolve the circuit split by adopting the judgment-of-foreclosureas-final-judgment approach taken by the majority of the courts of appeals.192
The Court has shown an interest in addressing issues of finality. For
instance, this Term alone, the Court has issued an opinion refining the meaning
of a final judgment in the bankruptcy court context193 and granted a petition for
writ of certiorari in a case addressing what constitutes a final order of the
Railroad Retirement Board.194 If the Court took up the issue, it could declare,
in line with its own precedents and those of the courts of appeals, that a district
court order finding the defendant liable, declaring the amount of debt he owes
to the plaintiff and other parties with interests in the property, ordering a
foreclosure sale, and indicating how the proceeds of the sale should be paid out
constitutes a final judgment over which an appellate court has jurisdiction under
§ 1291 (with any necessary adjustment for reinstatement rights195).
2. Resolution via Rulemaking
Although the Court could easily resolve the final judgment problem by
fashioning new doctrine when presented with the issue, the Rules Enabling
Act196 provides a unique alternative solution in this case. That statute empowers
the Court to craft a new rule of civil procedure to resolve the issue and declare
when, in the foreclosure setting, a judgment becomes final for purposes of
appeal. Given that the Act includes language that authorizes the use of the
rulemaking process to resolve the question at the heart of this Comment, and in
light of the Court’s deference to that process, an interesting potential way to
resolve the circuit split here is through the creation of a new rule.
The Rules Enabling Act, when it was passed, “represented the conclusion
of a campaign, conducted for more than twenty years . . . for a uniform federal
191 E.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998) (noting that the courts
of appeals have a “special obligation” to satisfy themselves of their own jurisdiction “even though
the parties are prepared to concede it”).
192 See generally supra Part II.
193 Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582, 583 (2020). The Court has also
discussed ﬁnality of judgments in passing in other opinions from this Term. E.g., Atl. Richﬁeld Co.
v. Christian, No. 17-1498, 2020 WL 1906542, at *6 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2020) (addressing what makes a
state supreme court’s order ﬁnal for purposes of U.S. Supreme Court review).
194 Salinas v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 140 S. Ct. 813, 813 (2020) (granting cert petition); see also Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari at 2-5, Salinas, 140 S. Ct. 813 (No. 19-199), 2019 WL 3930590, at *2-5.
195 See supra notes 147–149 and accompanying text.
196 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018).
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procedure bill authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of
procedure in civil actions at law.”197 The Act bestowed upon the Supreme
Court “the power to prescribe, by general rules, . . . the practice and procedure
in civil actions at law” in the federal district courts.198 The statute bolstered
the power of the rules that it authorized by preempting any laws that conflicted
with them.199 At the same time, however, it cabined the Court’s rulemaking
power by requiring that the rules neither “abridge, enlarge, nor modify the
substantive rights of any litigant.”200
Over time, Congress expanded this initial grant of authority to also allow for
the promulgation of rules governing criminal cases and the appeals process.201
In its current form, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) gives the Court “the power to prescribe
general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the
United States district courts . . . and courts of appeals.”202 This law, along with
several supporting statutes,203 has created a system in which advisory
committees consisting of judges and legal scholars develop proposals for new or
revised rules and submit them to the Standing Committee.204 The Standing
Committee passes any rules that it approves over to the Judicial Conference of
the United States and ultimately to the Supreme Court.205 The Court approves
the rules, transmits them to Congress, and officially promulgates them, unless
Congress enacts legislation rejecting or modifying the rules.206
In 1990, Congress expanded § 2072 as part of a larger overhaul of the
federal judiciary.207 The new § 2072(c) allows the Supreme Court to prescribe
general rules of practice and procedure that “may define when a ruling of a

197 Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1024 (1982);
see also Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and
Procedural Eﬃcacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 888 (1999) (describing the rules formulation process as “the
cornerstone of civil rulemaking in the federal courts”).
198 Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (1934).
199 Id. (codiﬁed as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2018)).
200 Id.
201 16A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 38, § 3947.1 n.3; see also id. § 3950.8 & nn.38-44.
202 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2018).
203 See generally id. §§ 2072–2077.
204 See How the Rulemaking Process Works, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/rulespolicies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-process-works [https://perma.cc/6NFX-SXA9]
(last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
205 Id. The Judicial Conference, the national policymaking body of the federal courts, is presided
over by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and is comprised of the chief circuit judges, the chief
judge of the Court of International Trade, and one district judge from each judicial circuit. About the
Judicial Conference, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/governance-judicialconference/about-judicial-conference [https://perma.cc/EDU7-9QD3] (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
206 How the Rulemaking Process Works, supra note 204.
207 Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 315, 104 Stat. 5089, 5115 (codiﬁed
at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c)).
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district court is final for the purposes of appeal” under § 1291.208 In a similar
vein, Congress later added a provision to § 1292 allowing the Court to
prescribe rules, in accordance with § 2072, “to provide for an appeal of an
interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals” beyond those appeals
authorized by the other subsections of § 1292.209
Following the creation of § 2072(c), the Supreme Court has expressed a
preference to handle questions of finality for purposes of appeal through the
rulemaking process. The Court has repeatedly acknowledged Congress’s express
grant of authority to the rulemaking system when it has decided cases involving
appellate jurisdiction.210 It has viewed Congress’s creation of § 2072(c) as a
conscious decision to designate the rulemaking process as the mechanism for
defining what district court rulings can be appealed, one which “warrants the
Judiciary’s full respect.”211 As a result, the Court has demonstrated a marked
hesitancy to resolve questions of appealability on its own and, in particular, to
expand the power of litigants to appeal lower court rulings, holding that any
“changes are to come from rulemaking . . . not judicial decisions in particular
controversies or inventive litigation ploys.”212 This preference for the
promulgation of rules as the main avenue for expanding appealability is
heightened due to the Court’s belief in the process’s “important virtues,” which

208 Id. But see Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Dynegy Mktg. & Trade, 415 F.3d 354, 358 (4th
Cir. 2005) (suggesting that this provision simply dispelled “any doubt that the Court had the
authority” to promulgate such rules even before it was passed).
209 Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 101, 106 Stat. 4506, 4506
(codiﬁed at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2018)).
210 See, e.g., Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 113-14 (2009) (speaking for a
unanimous Court in referring to the use of rulemaking as the “preferred means” of determining whether
district court orders are appealable and noting that “[a]ny further avenue for immediate appeal of such
rulings should be furnished, if at all, through rulemaking, with the opportunity for full airing it
provides”); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 310 (1995) (acknowledging Congress’s authorization of
rulemaking as a vehicle for evaluating the merits of allowing certain interlocutory appeals); see also StoltNielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 691-92 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (in
determining whether a district court order was final, looking to whether Congress provided for its
immediate review and acknowledging congressional establishment of exceptions to the final judgment
rule such as § 2072(c)); cf. United States v. Wampler, 624 F.3d 1330, 1338 (10th Cir. 2010) (declining to
define finality for purposes of appeal more broadly than defined under existing case law “[o]ut of
deference to the rubric Congress has created” in § 2072(c)).
211 Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 48 (1995).
212 Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1714 (2017); see also id. at 1712 (rejecting a tactic
by litigants designed to enable them to appeal earlier in the litigation process than they otherwise
could because it “subverts the ﬁnal-judgment rule and the process Congress has established for
reﬁning that rule”); Swint, 514 U.S. at 48 (in discussing the Court’s ability to fashion which decisions
and orders can be appealed, noting that “[t]he procedure Congress ordered for such changes,
however, is not expansion by court decision, but by rulemaking under § 2072”).
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arise because rulemaking “draws on the collective experience of bench and bar”
and “facilitates the adoption of measured, practical solutions.”213
As recently as 2018, the Court in Hall v. Hall continued to defer to the
power of the rulemaking process to revise or expand the categories of orders
that can be appealed.214 There, the Court, in interpreting a provision of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, relied on the proceedings of the Rules
Advisory Committee and gave signiﬁcant weight to the “laborious drafting
process” and “many layers of careful review” that went into formulating the
Rule.215 It reiterated that changes to the meaning of the phrase “ﬁnal decision”
in § 1291 should come from rulemaking, not judicial decisions.216 The Court
resolved the interpretive question in the case, but it emphasized that if its
conclusion gave rise to practical problems for district courts and litigants, “the
appropriate Federal Rules Advisory Committees would certainly remain free
to take the matter up and recommend revisions accordingly.”217
The rulemakers have already taken up Congress’s invitation to craft rules
defining the scope of appellate jurisdiction in the class-action context. Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), a court of appeals can choose to permit
an appeal from an order granting or denying class-action certification.218 In
formulating this rule, the Advisory Committee expressly relied on the authority
granted to the rulemakers by § 1291(e) to promulgate it.219 The Supreme Court
subsequently held in Microsoft Corp. v. Baker that the promulgation of Rule 23(f)
had, in effect, decided the line-drawing issue of when a litigant could appeal in
this context, and it therefore declined to expand appealability any further
through judicial decisionmaking.220 In doing so, the Court refused to substitute
its own views on the propriety of appellate jurisdiction in this arena for those of
the Advisory Committee, noting that
[i]n this case, the rulemaking process has dealt with the matter, yielding a
measured, practical solutio[n] to the questions whether and when adverse
213 Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 114; see also Swint, 514 U.S. at 48 (emphasizing that the
rulemaking process requires submission of rules to Congress before they take eﬀect, as well as
transparency and accountability to the public).
214 138 S. Ct. 1118, 1131 (2018).
215 Id. at 1122, 1129-31.
216 Id. at 1131.
217 Id.
218 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
219 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note to 1998 amendment.
220 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1709-10, 1712-1714 (2017). The plaintiffs in Baker were denied permission by the
Ninth Circuit under Rule 23(f) to appeal the district court’s denial of class certification. Id. at 1706. As
a result, they stipulated to a voluntary dismissal of their claims with prejudice, reserving the right to
revive their claims if the appellate court reversed the denial of class certification. Id. at 1706-07. They
subsequently appealed the district court’s grant of the motion to dismiss, challenging only the court’s
interlocutory order striking their class allegations. Id. at 1711. While the Ninth Circuit reviewed the
judgment below as a final order under § 1291, the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 1711-12.
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certiﬁcation orders may be immediately appealed. Over years the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure studied the data on classcertiﬁcation rulings and appeals, weighed various proposals, received public
comment, and reﬁned the draft rule and Committee Note. Rule 23(f) reﬂects
the rulemakers’ informed assessment . . . . That assessment warrants the
Judiciary’s full respect.221

The Court has thus strongly endorsed the appropriateness of the rulemaking
process as a means of resolving difficult questions of appealability.222 This “full
respect,”223 along with the will of Congress in twice endowing the Court with
authority to more frequently utilize the rulemaking process as a problem-solving
tool in this space, makes the prescription of a new procedural rule to resolve the
question of finality in mortgage foreclosures an attractive remedy.
The Court and the rulemakers have not yet taken advantage of the power
under § 2072(c) to develop a rule deﬁning when a district court’s order
constitutes a ﬁnal judgment.224 Given the practical signiﬁcance of the
resolution of the question presented here and the growing disagreement
among the courts of appeals, this issue provides an appealing opportunity to
utilize the rulemaking authority that Congress laid out in the statute.
One diﬃculty in doing so may be that, with quite a few notable
exceptions,225 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tend to apply broadly to
Id. at 1714 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Even before Congress’s development of § 1292(e) and § 2072(c), the Court of its own accord
had already used the rulemaking process to set out situations in which litigants could appeal district
court orders by creating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b). See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b)
(allowing a district court to direct entry of final judgment as to some, but not all, of the claims in
cases involving multiple claims or parties); Pollis, supra note 63, at 719-22 (examining the origins of
the Rule in the first iteration of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see also Note, Appealability in
the Federal Courts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 351, 357-58 (1961) (noting that the motivation behind Rule 54(b)
was to prevent hardship for litigants whose rights were determined prior to the conclusion of the
entire action); cf. Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Dynegy Mktg. & Trade, 415 F.3d 354, 358 (4th Cir.
2005) (arguing that § 2072(c) merely clarified a power that the Court already possessed).
223 Baker, 137 S. Ct. at 1714.
224 See McClendon v. City of Albuquerque, 630 F.3d 1288, 1296 (10th Cir. 2011) (emphasizing
that “congressionally prescribed means” now exist under § 2072(c) that should be used to deﬁne
which orders are “suﬃciently or ‘practically’ ﬁnal” for purposes of appeal). But see Blair v. Equifax
Check Servs., 181 F.3d 832, 833 (7th Cir. 1999) (claiming that the Court has not yet used § 2072(c)
“in part because it invites the question whether a particular rule truly ‘deﬁnes’ or instead expands
appellate jurisdiction,” as compared to § 1292(e), which “expressly authorizes expansions”).
225 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(c) (governing actions for Social Security benefits and certain
immigration cases); FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (addressing claims alleging fraud or mistake); FED. R. CIV. P.
23.1 (governing shareholder derivative actions); FED. R. CIV. P. 23.2 (concerning actions brought by or
against members of an unincorporated association); FED. R. APP. P. 44 (governing appeals of cases
raising a question of the constitutionality of a statute); FED. R. CIV. P. A–G (Supplemental Rules for
Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions); U.S. COURTS, RULES GOVERNING
SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (2019) (dictating procedures in
cases involving petitions for writs of habeas corpus).
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all cases, rather than aﬀecting cases concerning particular subject matters. A
rule that is particularly speciﬁc in its application, such as the one this
Comment proposes, could raise concerns regarding the Rules Enabling Act’s
requirement that the rules promulgated through the rulemaking process be
“general rules,”226 a phrase that has been broadly understood to require
transsubstantive rulemaking.227 Furthermore, § 2072(b) prohibits rules that
“abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”228 In light of this, the
Supreme Court has required that a rule must “really regulate[] procedure” to
satisfy the Rules Enabling Act.229
It is noteworthy, however, that the Supreme Court has never invalidated a
rule promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act in the eighty-five years since
the Act’s passage.230 Instead, the Court has opted to avoid Rules Enabling Act
issues by narrowly interpreting rules in a manner that conforms with the Act’s
jurisdictional limitation.231 There is thus some reason to think that a rule
governing finality in foreclosure cases would be consistent with the dictates of
the Act. In addition, Congress expressly added a provision to the Rules Enabling
Act allowing the Court to establish rules that define when a district court’s ruling
is a final judgment for the purposes of appeal.232 A new rule to resolve the issue
of finality in the foreclosure context, then, may well satisfy the Rules Enabling
Act, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s past unwillingness to invalidate
properly promulgated rules. Any such rule would be no more substance-specific
than a decent number of the existing rules.233

28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2018).
See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV.
535, 541 (“One of the foundational assumptions of modern American procedure is that the Rules
Enabling Act’s reference to ‘general rules’ forecloses the promulgation of diﬀerent prospective rules
for cases that involve diﬀerent bodies of substantive law.”).
228 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
229 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
230 Catherine T. Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Uniformity, and As-Applied Challenges
under the Rules Enabling Act, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1181, 1183 (2011); see also Linda S. Mullenix,
The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action Amendments, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 618 (“The
generalized Rules Enabling Act argument is inherently unresolvable. Neither the Supreme Court in
a series of cases nor academic exegesis over ﬁve decades has cogently illuminated how best to
determine whether a rule is ‘substantive’ or ‘procedural.’”).
231 See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1102, 1147 (2002) (“[T]he Court . . . has never enforced [§ 2072(b)’s] restriction
directly by invalidating a Rule. Instead, the Court gives the Rules a presumption of validity, but construes
them so as to avoid some of the resulting Enabling Act problems.”); cf. Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek,
Forum Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1039, 1042 (2002) (describing
the Court’s narrow reading of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) as “strained, indeed opaque”).
232 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (“Such rules may deﬁne when a ruling of a district court is ﬁnal for
the purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this title.”).
233 See supra note 225.
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Of course, that the rulemakers have the power to resolve this issue does
not mean that they will choose to do so. They may wait to see if the circuit
split resolves itself, but as discussed above, the Seventh Circuit may prove
unwilling (at least for some time) to reverse its own precedents, and it may
take some time before the Supreme Court agrees to address the issue.
However, the Advisory Committee has in recent years shown interest in
addressing appealability through the rulemaking process. The Committee
explored doing so after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Mohawk Industries and
Swint emphasized the value of the rulemaking process as a tool to resolve issues
in this area.234 In 2013, then-Chief Counsel to the Rules Committee Andrea
Kuperman sent a memo to the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules to aid
its evaluation of whether to address the appealability of certain prejudgment
orders.235 She identified areas of disagreement among lower courts as to the
finality of certain rulings and flagged other issues involving appealability that
she believed were worthy of exploration.236 Even then, several members of the
Committee expressed hesitation about the prospect of undertaking widescale
reform of appealability doctrine through rulemaking. Judge Steven M. Colloton
of the Eighth Circuit suggested that the Committee instead “consider the
appealability of particular types of interlocutory orders as and when a suggestion
brings that specific type of order to the Committee’s attention.”237
The Committee, in fact, considered addressing the appealability of orders
compelling disclosure of records over an assertion of attorney-client privilege. It
did so in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Mohawk Industries, which held
that such orders do not satisfy the collateral order doctrine but suggested that
rulemaking under § 1292(e) would be a suitable method for making these kinds
of rulings appealable as interlocutory orders.238 In 2014, the Committee held
discussions as to the merits of crafting a rule to address the issue in Mohawk
Industries but ultimately declined to do so.239
In addition, the rulemakers are currently exploring addressing the finality
of orders in cases consolidated under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42,
See supra notes 210–213.
Memorandum from Andrea L. Kuperman, Chief Counsel, Rules Committee, to Judge
Steven M. Colloton and Professor Catherine T. Struve (Sept. 20, 2013), in ADVISORY COMM. ON
APPELLATE RULES, AGENDA FOR SPRING 2014 MEETING OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
APPELLATE RULES 367 (2014), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/fr_import/2014-04Appeals-Agenda-Book.pdf [https://perma.cc/GR4M-MCBV].
236 Id. at 367-81.
237 ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, MINUTES OF SPRING 2014 MEETING OF
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES 15-16 (2014), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/fr_import/appellate-minutes-04-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/296S-6YDN].
238 Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 112-14 (2009).
239 ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, MINUTES OF FALL 2014 MEETING OF
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES 7-9 (2014), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/appellate-minutes-10-2014_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WYU-JCJF].
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following the Supreme Court’s invitation in Hall v. Hall.240 That opinion
expressly indicated that the rulemakers “remain[ed] free to take the matter up
and recommend provisions accordingly” if the rule that it set created practical
problems.241 Shortly after that decision, the Appellate Rules and Civil Rules
Committees launched an effort to explore the potential of exercising the
authority granted in § 2072(c) and crafting a rule defining when a district court
ruling is final in consolidated cases.242 This initiative is ongoing and is
currently focused on analyzing the findings of a research project by the Federal
Judicial Center examining Rule 42 consolidations in the district courts.243
These episodes show that the rulemakers are certainly open to addressing
discrete issues of appealability and has acknowledged the Supreme Court’s
advocacy for the use of rulemaking to handle such questions. In light of the
Court’s continued line of decisions emphasizing the utility of this avenue as a
vehicle for reforming appealability doctrine, it is quite possible that the
Committee would be willing to at least explore reforming the issue of the finality
and appealability of foreclosure orders through rulemaking.
As a result, the Advisory Committee should consider crafting a rule
indicating that when a plaintiff possesses a security interest in the defendant’s
property and seeks to foreclose on that property, a district court judgment
finding the defendant liable for failure to pay his debt and ordering the
collection of the debt by enforcing the security interest is a final judgment for
purposes of appeal. It may make sense for the rule to leave to the courts the
resolution of any issues arising in jurisdictions that provide a right of
reinstatement (much as courts have handled comparable scenarios involving
contingent decisions244), as that issue is a quite narrow one and relatively easy
to address under existing doctrine if it comes up.
B. Congressional Intervention
Considering the Court’s deference to the role of Congress in shaping which
judgments are appealable,245 the legislative branch can also play a role in
138 S. Ct. 1118 (2018); see also supra notes 214–217 and accompanying text.
138 S. Ct. at 1131.
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, AGENDA FOR JANUARY 2019 MEETING
193-98 (2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2019-01-standing_agenda_book.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K5K5-V73X].
243 See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, AGENDA FOR APRIL 2020 MEETING 187-92
(2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/04-2020_civil_rules_agenda_book.pdf [https://
perma.cc/NR6Z-WWU4].
244 See supra notes 147–149 and accompanying text.
245 E.g., Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 399 (1957) (“It is axiomatic, as a matter of history
as well as doctrine, that the existence of appellate jurisdiction in a specific federal court over a given type
of case is dependent upon authority expressly conferred by statute.”); see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 38 (“The jurisdictional nature of the final judgment rule depends entirely upon statutory choice.”).
240
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addressing the competing approaches to finality in mortgage foreclosure cases.
After all, the power granted to the Court to create rules governing finality
discussed in the prior Section originated from congressional authorizations.246
Congress should consider intervening directly to establish a rule of finality to
govern foreclosure cases brought in or removed to federal court.247
While the Supreme Court has driven a significant share of the development
of appellate jurisdiction and the finality doctrine in the federal court system,248
Congress has also played a substantial role. Most prominently, it established the
categories of appealable interlocutory decisions recognized in § 1292.249 Beyond
the broad grants in § 1292, Congress has also declared certain rulings appealable
in a variety of more substance-specific contexts.250 As a result, the legislative
branch has experience in making the difficult balancing decisions inherent in
determining when a party can appeal in the litigation process.251
Congress should consider intervening to resolve the question of when a
litigant can appeal in mortgage foreclosure cases, especially if the Supreme
Court is not presented with the issue (or refrains from deciding it252) and the
Advisory Committee fails to take it up. Given the potential for significant harm

28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(e), 2072 (2018).
Congress’s authority to regulate federal court procedure comes from its power to “ordain
and establish” lower federal courts under Article III. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Budinich v. Becton
Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988) (noting that “enactments ‘rationally capable of
classiﬁcation’ as procedural rules are necessary and proper for carrying into execution the power to
establish federal courts vested in Congress” and thus are lawful as an exercise of that power (quoting
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965))); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941)
(concluding that “Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal
courts”). Congress has also exercised this power by authorizing the rulemaking process. See id.;
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 388-89 (1989) (acknowledging Congress’s power to establish
the Rules Enabling Act and to delegate some of its authority in this space to the courts).
248 See generally supra Section I.B and subsection IV.A.1.
249 28 U.S.C. § 1292; see also supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text.
250 See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 16(a) (allowing for appeals of certain orders, interlocutory orders, and
ﬁnal judgments in the arbitration context); 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (enabling the United States to appeal
certain district court orders in criminal cases); 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (providing for direct Supreme Court
review of orders by statutory three-judge district courts granting or denying injunctions); id.
§ 1447(d) (allowing appellate review of orders remanding a case to state court following removal to
federal court in civil rights cases); see also Comment, Consolidation of Pretrial Proceedings Under
Proposed Section 1407 of the Judicial Code: Unanswered Questions of Transfer and Review, 33 U. CHI. L.
REV. 558, 566 (1966) (summarizing Congress’s involvement in this space). Congress has also not
hesitated to change its mind and revoke a grant of appealability, further illustrating its openness to
legislation as a means of regulating appealability. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982) (repealed 1988)
(providing for direct Supreme Court review of an interlocutory decree or ﬁnal judgment holding an
Act of Congress unconstitutional); 11 U.S.C. § 47 (repealed, as noted in Heller v. Montgomery, 699
F.2d 399, 400 (7th Cir. 1983)) (allowing for interlocutory appeals in certain bankruptcy proceedings).
251 Cf. supra notes 52–60 and accompanying text.
252 Cf. Townsend v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 136 S. Ct. 897, 897 (2016) (denying Townsend’s
petition for writ of certiorari without comment).
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that defendants would face when their homes may be foreclosed,253 as well as
Congress’s willingness in the past to address appealability even in relatively
narrowly defined legal fields,254 the issue is ripe for congressional resolution.
Just because Congress has the competence and experience to address an
issue, however, does not mean that it is the best or most feasible avenue for
reform. In the decades since the passage of the judicial reform statutes of the
early 1990s, Congress has grown increasingly gridlocked and polarized, making
any legislative solution far less likely to succeed in the current political
climate.255 On top of this environment, the issue this Comment addresses is a
relatively narrow one that may not inspire interest from lawmakers on its own.
It is thus possible that Congress may only be willing to address this issue as part
of a larger reform effort of either the housing market or the federal judiciary.256
Any such bill may face opposition from groups such as the credit industry,
who will likely be quite unhappy with the prospect of legislation that makes
it harder for lenders to foreclose on homes and recover on their mortgages.
Some of their concerns may nonetheless be alleviated, since the law would
make the foreclosure process more straightforward and predictable for them
as well as for homeowners by removing the risk of diﬀerent courts taking
diﬀerent approaches to appealability.
Ultimately, it may be quite probable that Congress will simply be unable or
unwilling to act to resolve this issue unless confronted with its effects on
homeowners—for instance, if another downturn in the housing market occurs.257
Even then, achieving satisfactory reform in the area may be elusive. The ongoing
coronavirus pandemic unfortunately seems to present such a crisis, providing
slight hope that Congress will refocus its attention on the foreclosure process.258
See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (three-judge statutory district courts); id. § 1292(a)(3)
(admiralty); id. 1447(d) (remanded federal civil rights cases).
255 See, e.g., Molly E. Reynolds, How to Measure a Dysfunctional, Gridlocked Congress, BROOKINGS
INST. (June 28, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/06/28/how-to-measure-a-dysfu
nctional-gridlocked-congress [https://perma.cc/85NX-WW23] (quantifying the growing breakdown
in bipartisan efforts in Congress and failure to accomplish significant legislative goals).
256 For examples of recent, large-scale congressional acts reforming the federal judicial system, see
generally Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506, and Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089.
257 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Congress last took significant action to regulate the
housing market in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis. See generally Housing and Economic
Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654; N. ERIC WEISS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL34623, HOUSING AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT OF 2008 (2008).
258 As of the writing of this Comment, the pandemic threatens to disrupt the housing market,
potentially inviting widescale action by Congress. See Nicole Friedman, Coronavirus Looms Over Crucial
Spring Season for Housing Market, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
coronavirus-seen-slowing-crucial-spring-season-for-housing-market-coronavirus-looms-over-crucialspring-season-for-housing-market-coronavirus-threatens-crucial-spring-season-for-housing-market-11
583963949 [https://perma.cc/K85T-73VA]. In fact, government bodies at all levels have sought to
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If Congress does act, it should implement a statute that grants the federal
courts of appeals appellate jurisdiction over a judgment ordering foreclosures
of property in satisfaction of a security interest following default on a loan,
as long as the judgment ﬁnds liability on the defendant’s part, sets the amount
of damages, and orders the sale of speciﬁc property to satisfy the judgment.
CONCLUSION
In light of the stark disagreement among the courts of appeals on the issue
of finality in mortgage foreclosures, along with the impact that foreclosures can
have on those affected by them, it is essential to resolve the dispute. Under the
Townsend approach, a homeowner who lives outside of Illinois or Wisconsin
lacks a clear way of knowing when exactly he should appeal if he loses in a
foreclosure action. If he moves too soon, he could see his appeal dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction, yielding him nothing but wasted time and resources. If he
waits too long and it turns out that the foreclosure order was final, he could
surrender his opportunity to overturn an erroneous ruling by the district court
that would force him out of his home. But even if he challenges the judgment
on time, he may not be able to obtain a stay to stop the loss of his home, which
sits at most thirty days away from the confirmation of sale. Beyond this potential
for significant harm to homeowners, the Townsend rule threatens broader
markets, as buyers in a foreclosure sale may be hesitant to actively involve
themselves, knowing that the underlying merits of the foreclosure have not yet
undergone appellate review. Should this risk lead to lower purchase prices on
the foreclosed homes, that might result in higher deficiency judgments entered
personally against defendants, presenting even greater potential for ruin.
Looking beyond these practical ramifications, the Townsend rule fails to
justify the harm that it threatens to cause, as it diverges from the views of at
least four other circuit courts of appeals without providing a strong rationale
for doing so. That competing view squarely holds that a judgment of
foreclosure that definitively establishes liability and identifies the property to
be sold is final and appealable. This rule falls much more squarely in line with
Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit finality precedents, the pecuniary
remedy that underlies the goal of foreclosure proceedings, and the need for
bright-line rules to govern issues of federal civil procedure. As a result, it is
essential to establish a singular rule across the country in line with that
perspective, and there are multiple tools available for the courts, the Federal
Rules Standing Committee, or Congress to effectuate this crucial undertaking.
prevent foreclosures and evictions during the pandemic in order to try to head off a housing crisis. See
Conor Dougherty et al., Racing to Head Off Evictions and Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/18/business/economy/coronavirus-evictions.html [https://perma.cc
/6ZK9-HQ9F]; O’Donnell, supra note 8.

